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Abstract
We study the sample complexity of learning revenue-optimal multi-item auctions. We obtain the first
set of positive results that go beyond the standard but unrealistic setting of item-independence. In partic-
ular, we consider settings where bidders’ valuations are drawn from correlated distributions that can be
captured by Markov Random Fields or Bayesian Networks – two of the most prominent graphical mod-
els. We establish parametrized sample complexity bounds for learning an up-to-ε optimal mechanism in
both models, which scale polynomially in the size of the model, i.e. the number of items and bidders, and
only exponential in the natural complexity measure of the model, namely either the largest in-degree (for
Bayesian Networks) or the size of the largest hyper-edge (for Markov Random Fields).
We obtain our learnability results through a novel and modular framework that involves first proving
a robustness theorem. We show that, given only “approximate distributions” for bidder valuations, we
can learn a mechanism whose revenue is nearly optimal simultaneously for all “true distributions” that
are close to the ones we were given in Prokhorov distance. Thus, to learn a good mechanism, it suffices to
learn approximate distributions. When item values are independent, learning in Prokhorov distance is im-
mediate, hence our framework directly implies the main result of Gonczarowski and Weinberg [36]. When
item values are sampled from more general graphical models, we combine our robustness theorem with
novel sample complexity results for learning Markov Random Fields or Bayesian Networks in Prokhorov
distance, which may be of independent interest. Finally, in the single-item case, our robustness result can
be strengthened to hold under an even weaker distribution distance, the Le´vy distance.
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1 Introduction
A central problem in Economics and Computer Science is the design of revenue-optimal auctions. The
problem involves a seller who wants to sell one or more items to one or more strategic bidders. As bidders’
valuation functions are private, no meaningful revenue guarantee can be achieved without any information
about these functions. To remove this impossibility, it is standard to make a Bayesian assumption, whereby a
joint distribution from which bidders’ valuations are drawn is assumed common knowledge, and the goal
is to design an auction that maximizes expected revenue with respect to this distribution.
In the single-item setting, a celebrated result by Myerson characterizes the optimal auction when bidder
values are independent [49]. The quest for optimal multi-item auctions has been quite more challenging.
It has been recognized that revenue-optimal multi-item auctions can be really complex and may exhibit
counter-intuitive properties [39, 40, 9, 22, 23]. As such, it is doubtful that there is a clean characterization
similar to Myerson’s for the optimal multi-item auction. On the other hand, there has been significant
recent progress in efficient computation of revenue-optimal auctions [18, 19, 2, 10, 3, 12, 13, 16, 14, 4, 8, 24].
This progress has enabled the identification of simple auctions (mostly variants of sequential posted pricing
mechanisms) that achieve constant factor approximations to the optimum revenue [6, 56, 15, 20, 17], under
item-independence assumptions.1
Making Bayesian assumptions in the study of revenue-optimal auctions is both crucial and fruitful.
However, to apply the theory to practice, we would need to know the underlying distributions. Where
does such knowledge come from? A common answer is that we estimate the distributions through market
research or observation of bidder behavior in previously run auctions. Unavoidably, errors will creep in
to the estimation, and a priori it seems possible that the performance of our mechanisms may be fragile to
such errors. This has motivated a quest for optimal or approximately optimal mechanisms under imperfect
knowledge of the underlying distributions.
This problem has received lots of attention from Theory of Computation recently. The focus has been
on whether optimal or approximately optimal mechanisms are learnable given sample access to the true
distributions. In single-item settings, where Myerson’s characterization result applies, it is possible to learn
up-to-ε optimal auctions [32, 21, 46, 41, 48, 28, 52, 35].2 A recent paper by Guo et al. [37] provides upper
and lower bounds on the sample complexity, which are tight up to logarithmic factors, thereby rendering a
nearly complete picture for the single-item case.
In multi-item settings, largely due to the lack of simple characterizations of optimal mechanisms, results
have been sparser. Recent work [48, 34, 11, 55] has shown how to learn simple mechanisms which attain a
constant factor of the optimum revenue using polynomially many samples in the number of bidders and
items. Last year, a surprising result by Gonczarowski and Weinberg [36] shows that the sample complexity
of learning an up-to-ε optimal mechanism is also polynomial.3 However, all these results rely on the item-
independence assumption mentioned earlier, which limits their applicability. A main goal of our work is the
following:
Goal I: Push the boundary of learning (approximately) optimal multi-item auctions to the important
setting of item dependence.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to learn approximately optimal auctions from polynomially many sam-
ples under general item dependence. Indeed, an exponential sample complexity lower bound has been
established by Dughmi et al. [31] for even a single unit-demand buyer. Arguably, however, in auction
settings, as well as virtually any high-dimensional setting, the distributions that arise are not arbitrary.
Arbitrary high-dimensional distributions cannot be represented efficiently, and are known to require expo-
nentially many samples to learn or even perform the most basic statistical tests on them; see e.g. [25] for a
discussion. Accordingly a large focus of Statistics and Machine Learning has been on identifying structural
properties of high-dimensional distributions, which enable succinct representation, efficient learning, and
1Intuitively, item independence means that each bidder’s value for each item is independently distributed, and this definition has
been suitably generalized to set value functions such as submodular or subadditive functions [53].
2The term “up-to-ε optimal” introduced in [36] means an additive ε · H approximation for distributions supported on [0, H]. Under
tail assumption on the distribution, it is also possible to obtain (1− ε)-multiplicative approximations.
3In particular, they learn a mechanism that is O(ε)-truthful and has up-to-ε optimal revenue.
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efficient statistical inference. In line with this literature, we propose learning multi-item auctions under the
assumption that item values are jointly sampled from a high-dimensional distribution with structure.
There are several widely-studied probabilistic frameworks which allow modeling structure in a high-
dimensional distribution. In this work we consider two of the most prominent ones: Markov Random Fields
(MRFs) and Bayesian Networks, a.k.a. Bayesnets, which are the two most common types of graphical models.
Both MRFs and Bayesnets have been studied in Machine Learning and Statistics for decades. Both frame-
works can be used to express arbitrary high-dimensional distributions. Their advantage, however, is that
they are associated with natural complexity parameters which allow tuning the dependence structure in
the distributions they model, from product measures all the way up to arbitrary distributions. In Figure 1,
we show a very simple example illustrating how naturally these models express dependence structure in a
distribution. The figure shows a Bayesnet, which samples the values of a buyer for four items. The structure
of the Bayesnet implies (see Definition 8) that these values are sampled conditionally independently, con-
ditioning on the value of the variable at the root of the Bayesnet which is the state of the buyer’s residence.
The node is shaded because we assume that the corresponding variable is not observable. The pertinent
question is how we might exploit the structure of the distribution, as captured by the natural complexity
parameter of an MRF or a Bayesnet, to efficiently learn a good mechanism. At a high level, there are two
components to the problem of learning approximately optimal auctions. One is inference from samples, i.e. ex-
tracting information about the distribution using samples. The other is mechanism design, i.e. constructing a
good mechanism using the information extracted. A main goal of our work is:
Goal II: Provide a modular approach for learning multi-item auctions which decouples the Inference
and Mechanism Design components, so that one may leverage all techniques from Machine
Learning and Statistics to tackle the first and, independently, leverage all techniques from
Mechanism Design to address the second.
Unfortunately, the Statistical and Mechanism design components are complexly intertwined in prior
work on learning multi-item auctions. Specifically, [47, 11, 55, 36] are PAC-learning approaches, which
require a fine balance between (i) selecting a class of mechanisms that is rich enough to contain an approx-
imately optimal one for a class of distributions; and (ii) having small enough statistical complexity so that
the performance of all mechanisms in the class on a small sample is representative of their performance
with respect to the whole distribution, and so that a small sample suffices to select a good mechanism in
the class. See the related work section for a detailed discussion of these works and their natural limitations.
Our goal in this work is to avoid a joint consideration of (i) and (ii). Rather we want to obtain a learning
framework that separates Mechanism Design from Statistical Inference, based on the following:
(i)’ find an algorithm M, which given a distribution F in some family of distributions F , computes an
(approximately) optimal mechanismM(F) when bidders’ valuations are drawn from F;
(ii)’ find an algorithm L, which given sample access to a distribution F from the family of distributions F
learns a distribution L(F) that is close to F in some distribution distance d.
Achieving (i)’ and (ii)’ is of course not enough, unless we also guarantee the following:
(iii)’ given an (approximately) optimal mechanism M for some F there is a way to transform M to some
M′ that is approximately optimal for any distribution F′ that is close to F under distribution distance d.
Given (i)’–(iii)’, the learnability of (approximately) optimal mechanisms for a family of distributions F
can be established as follows: (a) Given sample access to some distribution F ∈ F we use L to learn
some distribution F′ that is close to F under d; (b) we then useM to compute an (approximately) optimal
mechanism M′ for F′; and (c) finally, we use (iii)’ to argue that M′ can be converted to a mechanism M that is
(approximately) optimal for F because M is (approximately) optimal for any distribution that is close to F′.
Clearly, (iii)’ is important for decoupling (i)’—i.e. computing (approximately) optimal mechanisms for
a family of distributions F , and (ii)’—i.e. learning distributions in F . At the same time, it is important in
its own right:
Goal III: Develop robust mechanism design tools, allowing to transform a mechanism M designed for
some distribution F into a mechanism Mrobust which attains similar performance simultane-
ously for all distributions that are close to F in some distribution distance of interest.
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The reason Goal III is interesting in its own right is that oftentimes we actually have no sample access to the
underlying distribution over valuations. It is possible that we estimate that distribution through market
research or econometric analysis in related settings, so we only know some approximate distribution. In
other settings, we may have sample access to the true distribution but there might be errors in measuring
or recording those samples. In both cases, we would know some approximate distribution F that is close
to the true distribution under some distribution distance, and we would want to use F to identify a good
mechanism for the unknown distribution that is close to F. Clearly, outputting a mechanism M that attains
good performance under F might be a terrible idea as this mechanism might very well overfit the details of
F. So we need to “robustify” M. A similar goal was pursued in the work of Bergemann and Schlag [7], for
single-item and single-bidder settings, and in the work of Cai and Daskalakis [11], for robustifying a specific
class of mechanisms under item-independence. Our goal here is to provide a very general robustification
result.
1.1 Our Results
We discuss our contributions in the setting of additive bidders, whose values for the items are not neces-
sarily independent. Our results hold for quite more general valuations, including constrained additive and
any family of Lipschitz valuations (Definition 2), but we do not discuss these here to avoid overloading our
notation. We will denote by n the number of bidders, and by m the number of items. We will also assume
that the bidders’ values for the items lie in some bounded interval [0, H].
Our Robustness Results (cf. Goal III above). The setting we consider is the following. We are given a
collection of model distributions D = {Di}i∈[n], one for each bidder i = 1, . . . , n. We do not know the true
distributions D̂ = {D̂i}i sampling the valuations of the bidders, and the only information we have about
each D̂i is that d(Di, D̂i) < ε, under some distribution distance d(·, ·)—we will discuss distances shortly.
Our goal is to design a mechanism that performs well under any possible collection of true distributions
{D̂i}i that are close to their corresponding distributions {Di}i under d. We show that there are robustifica-
tion algorithms, which transform a mechanism M into a robust mechanism M̂ that attains similar revenue
to that of M under D, except that M̂’s revenue guarantee holds simultaneously for any collection D̂ that is
close to D. Applying our robustification algorithm to the optimum mechanism for D allows us to obtain
the results reported in the first three columns of Table 1. DSIC and BIC refer to the standard properties of
Dominant Strategy and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility of mechanisms, IR refers to the standard notion of
Individual Rationality, and η-BIC is the standard notion of approximate Bayesien Incentive Compatibility.
For completeness these notions are reviewed in Appendix B.
Some remarks are in order. First, in multi-item settings, it is unavoidable that our robustified mechanism
is only approximately BIC, as we do not know the true distributions. In single-item settings, the optimal
mechanism is DSIC, and we can indeed robustify it into a mechanism M̂ that is DSIC. In the multi-item
case, however, it is known that DSIC mechanisms sometimes can extract at most a constant fraction of the
optimal revenue [57], so it is necessary to consider BIC mechanisms and the BIC property is fragile to errors
in the distributions.
Second, we consider several natural distribution distances. In multi-item settings, we consider both
the Prokhorov and the Total Variation distance. In single-item settings, we consider both the Le´vy and the
Kolmogorov distance. Please see Section 2 for formal definitions of these distances and a discussion of their
relationships, and their relationship to other standard distribution distances. We note that the Le´vy distance
for single-dimensional distributions, and the Prokhorov distance for multi-dimensional distributions are
quite permissive notions of distribution distance. This makes our robustness results for these distances
stronger, automatically implying robustness results under several other common distribution distances.
Finally, en route to proving our robustness results, we show a result of independent interest, namely
that the optimal revenue is continuous with respect to the distribution distances that we consider. Our continuity
results are summarized in the last column of Table 1. Note that the continuity results are substantially easier
to establish than the robustness results, please see Section 1.2 for details.
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Setting Distance d Robustness Continuity
Single
Item
Kolmogrov
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ OPT
(
D̂
)
−O (nHε)
M̂ is IR and DSIC
(Theorem 2)
∣∣∣OPT(D̂)−OPT (D)∣∣∣ ≤ O(nHε)
(Theorem 2)
Le´vy
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ OPT
(
D̂
)
−O (nHε)
M̂ is IR and DSIC
(Theorem 1)
∣∣∣OPT(D̂)−OPT (D)∣∣∣ ≤ O(nHε)
(Corollary 1)
Multiple
Items
TV
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ OPTη
(
D̂
)
−O (n2mHε+ nmH√nε)
M̂ is IR and η- BIC w.r.t. D̂, where η = O (n2mHε)
(Theorem 12)
∣∣∣OPT(D̂)−OPT (D)∣∣∣ ≤ O (n2mHε+ nmH√nε)
(Theorem 11)
Prokhorov
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ OPTη
(
D̂
)
−O (nη + n√mHη)
M̂ is IR and η- BIC w.r.t. D̂, where η = O
(
nmHε+ m
√
nHε
)
(Theorem 12)
∣∣∣OPT(D)−OPT(D̂)∣∣∣ ≤ O (nξ + n√mHξ)
where ξ = O
(
nmHε+ m
√
nHε
)
(Theorem 11)
Table 1: Summary of Our Robustness and Revenue Continuity Results. Recall that the true bidder distributions D̂ are unknown, and that M̂ is the
robustified mechanism returned by our algorithm given an optimal mechanism M for a collection of bidder distributions D that are ε-close to D̂ under
distribution distance d. REV(M̂, D̂) denotes the revenue of M̂ when the bidder distributions are D̂. For a collection of bidder distributions F , OPT(F )
is the optimal revenue attainable by any BIC and IR mechanism under distributions F , and OPTη(F ) denotes the optimum revenue attainable by any
η-BIC and IR mechanism under F . Not included in the table are approximation preserving robustification results under TV and Prokhorov closeness.
We show that we can transform any c-approximation M w.r.t. D to a robust mechanism M̂, so that M̂ is almost a c-approximation w.r.t. D̂. The results
included in the table are corollaries of this more general result when c = 1. See our theorem statements for the complete details. Moreover, if there is only
a single bidder, we can strengthen our robustness results in multi-item settings so that M̂ is IC instead of η-IC (see Theorem 13). Our continuity results
hold for any D and D̂ as long as d(Di , D̂i) ≤ ε for each bidder i.
Learning Multi-Item Auctions Under Item Dependence (cf. Goal I above). In view of our robustness
results, presented above, the challenge of learning near-optimal auctions given sample access to the bid-
ders’ valuation distributions, becomes a matter of estimating these distributions in the required distribution
distance, depending on which robustification result we want to apply.
When the item values are independent, learning bidders’ type distributions in our desired distribution
distances is immediate. So we easily recover the guarantees of the main theorem of [36]. These guarantees
are summarized in the second row of Table 2, and are expanded upon in Theorem 6.
But a main goal of our work (namely Goal I from earlier) is to push the learnability of auctions well be-
yond item-independence. As stated earlier, it is impossible to attain learnability from polynomially many
samples for arbitrary joint distributions over item values so we consider the well-studied frameworks of
MRFs and Bayesnets. These frameworks are flexible and can model any distribution, but they have a tun-
able complexity parameter whose value controls the dependence structure. This parameter is the maximum
clique size of an MRF and maximum in-degree of a Bayesnet. We will denote this complexity parameter d
in both cases. Recall that we also used d(·, ·) to denote distribution distances. To disambiguate, whenever
we study MRFs or Bayesnets, we make sure to use d(·, ·), with parentheses, to denote distribution distances.
Note that a small value of the complexity parameter d does not mean that the corresponding MRF or Bayesnet
does not have correlations among every pair of item values. Many natural MRF structures, with d = 2, and
Bayesnet structures, with d = 1, permit distributions where all the variables are correlated, and indeed
any pair of variables remain correlated even after conditioning on the values of all the other variables. In
Figure 1, we show a simple such example where the values of a bidder on four items are sampled from
a Naive Bayes Model, which is a very simple type of Bayesnet with d = 1. While even small values of d
allow all pairs of variables to be correlated even conditioning on everything else, the complexity parameter
d forbids arbitrary dependence structures. Indeed, this is the reason why MRFs and Bayesnets are so preva-
lent. They allow rich dependent structures but not arbitrary ones, unless their complexity parameter d is
tuned up to its maximum possible value, i.e. equal to the total number of variables, in which case they can
express any dependence structure. In particular, a model of complexity d can express arbitrary dependence
on subsets of d (for MRFs) or d + 1 (for Bayesnets) variables, and it allows some dependence structures on
larger subsets of variables depending on the graphical structure of the model.
Now, in order to learn near-optimal mechanisms when item values for each bidder are sampled from an
MRF or a Bayesnet of certain complexity d, our robustness results reassure us that it suffices to learn MRFs
and Bayesnets under Total Variation or Prokhorov distance, depending on which multi-item robustenss
theorem we seek to apply. So we need an upper bound on the sample complexity necessary to learn MRFs
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Figure 1: The values of a buyer for an umbrella, a pair of sunglasses, a pair of skis, and a surfboard are sampled from a Naive Bayes model.
These values are sampled conditionally independently conditioning on the value of the variable at the root of the network, which is the state of the
buyer’s residence. This variable is latent, i.e. non-observable, and this is why the corresponding node of the network is shaded blue. The distribution
over (vumbrella, vsunglasses, vskis, vsurfboard) has the property that any pair of values remain correlated even conditioning on all the other values, unless the
conditional distributions in the Bayesnet have special structure.
and Bayesnets. One of the contributions of our paper is to provide very general sample complexity bounds
for learning these distributions, as summarized in Theorems 9 and 10 for MRFs and Bayesnets respectively.
In both theorems, V is the set of variables, d is the complexity measure of the underlying distribution,
and ε is the distance within which we are seeking to learn the distribution. Each theorem has a version
when the variables take values in a finite alphabet Σ, and a version when the variables take values in
some interval Σ = [0, H]. In the first case, we provide bounds for learning in the stronger notion of Total
Variation distance. In the second case, since we are learning from finitely many samples, we need to settle
for the weaker notion of Prokhorov distance. For the same reason, we need to make some Lipschitzness
assumption on the density, so our sample bounds depend on the Lipschitzness C of the MRF’s potential
functions and the Bayesnet’s conditional distributions.
The sample bounds we obtain for learning MRFs and Bayesnets are directly reflected in the sample
bounds we obtain for learning multi-item auctions when the item-values are sampled from an MRF or a
Bayesnet respectively, as summarized in the last two rows of Table 2. Indeed, the sample complexity for
learning auctions is entirely due to the sample complexity needed to learn the underlying item-distribution.
In all cases we consider, the complexity is polynomial in number of variables n = |V| and only depends
exponentially in d, the complexity of the distribution, and this is unavoidable. 4
Setting Revenue Guarantee and Sample Complexity Prior Result Technique
Item
Independence
up-to-ε optimal, η-BIC (Theorem 6)
poly (n, m, H, 1/ε, 1/η, log(1/δ))
recovers main
result of [36]
Prokhorov Robustness +
Learnability of Product Dist. (Folklore)
MRF
up-to-ε optimal, η-BIC (Theorem 7)
poly
(
n, md, |Σ|d, H, 1/η, 1/ε, log(1/δ)) (Finite Σ)
poly
(
n, md
2
, ( CHε )
d, 1/η, log(1/δ)
)
(Σ = [0, H])
unknown Prokhorov Robustness +Learnability of MRFs (Theorem 9)
Bayesnet
up-to-ε optimal, η-BIC (Theorem 8)
poly
(
n, d, m, |Σ|d+1, H, 1/η, 1/ε, log(1/δ)) (Finite Σ)
poly
(
n, dd+1, md+1, ( CHε )
d+1, 1/η, log(1/δ)
)
(Σ = [0, H])
unknown Prokhorov Robustness +Learnability of Bayesnets (Theorem 10)
Table 2: Summary of Our Sample-based Results. We denote by Σ the support of each item-marginal, taken to equal the interval [0, H] in the continuous
case, we use δ for the failure probability, and use d to denote the standard complexity measure of the graphical model used to model item dependence,
namely the size of the maximum hyperedge in MRFs and the largest in-degree in Bayesnets. For both MRFs and Bayesnets we allow latent variables and
we also do not need to know the underlying graphical structure. Moreover, for continuous distributions, our results require Lipschitzness of potential
functions in MRFs and conditional distributions in Bayesnets, which we denote with C. Finally, if there is only a single bidder, the mechanism we learnt
is strengthened to be IC instead of η-IC. See our theorem statements for our complete results.
Our sample bounds improve if the underlying graph of the MRF or Bayesnet are known and, impor-
4Note that the example by Dughmi et al. [31] can be captured by an MRF or Bayesnet with d = O(m), and it is shown in [31] that
the sample complexity for learning a mechanism that is a constant factor approximation to the optimal revenue in this example is at
least 2Ω(m).
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tantly, without any essential modifications our sample bounds hold even when there are latent, i.e. unobserved,
variables in the distribution. This makes both our auction and our distribution learning results much more
richly applicable. As a simple example of the modeling power of latent variables, situations can be captured
where an unobserved random variable determines the type of a bidder, and conditioning on this type the
observable values of the bidder for different items are sampled.
Finally, it is worth noting that our sample bounds for learning MRFs (i.e. Theorem 9) provide broad
generalizations of the bounds for learning Ising models and Gaussian MRFs presented in recent work of
Devroye et al [30]. Their bounds are obtained by bounding the VC complexity of the Yatracos class induced
by the distributions of interest, while our bounds are obtained by constructing ε-nets of the distributions of
interest, and running a tournament-style hypothesis selection algorithm [29, 26, 1] to select one distribution
from the net. Since the distribution families we consider are non-parametric, our main technical contribu-
tion is to bound the size of an ε-net sufficient to cover the distributions of interest. Interestingly, we use
properties of linear programs to argue through a sequence of transformations that the net size can be upper
bounded in terms of the bit complexity of solutions to a linear program that we construct.
1.2 Roadmap and Technical Ideas
In this section, we provide a roadmap to the paper and survey some of our technical ideas.
Single-item Robustness (Appendix 3) We consider first the setting where the model distribution D is
ε-close to the true, but unknown distribution D̂ in Kolmogorov distance. In this case, we argue directly
that Myerson’s optimal mechanism [49] for D is approximately optimal for any distribution that is in the
ε-Kolmogorov-ball around D, which includes D̂ (Theorem 2). The idea is that the revenue of the optimal
mechanism can be written as an integral over probabilities of events of the form: does vi lie in a certain
interval [a, b]? Since D and D̂ are ε-close in Kolmogorov distance, the probabilities of all such events are
within ε of each other, which implies that the revenues under D and D̂ are also close. Finally, note that
Myerson’s optimal mechanism is DSIC and IR, so it is truthful and IR w.r.t. any distribution.
Unfortunately, the same idea fails for Le´vy distance, as the difference in the probabilities of the event that
a certain vi lies in some interval [a, b] under D and D̂ can be as large as 1 even when D and D̂ are ε-close in
Le´vy distance. (Indeed, consider two single point distributions: a point mass at A and a point mass at A− ε;
their probabilities of falling in the interval [A− ε/2, A + ε/2] are respectively 1 and 0.) We thus prove our
robustness result for Le´vy distance via a different route. Given any model distribution D, we first construct
the “worst” distribution D and the “best” distribution D in the ε-Le´vy ball around D: this means that, for
any D̂ that lies in the ε-Le´vy ball around D, D̂ first-order stochastically dominates D and is dominated by
D (see Definition 3). We choose our robust mechanism M̂ to be Myerson’s optimal mechanism for D. It
is not hard to argue that M̂’s revenue under D̂ is at least OPT(D), the optimal revenue under the “worst”
distribution (Lemma 4), due to the revenue monotonicity lemma (Lemma 3) shown in [28]. The statement
provides a lower bound of M̂’s revenue under the unknown true distribution D̂. To complete the argument,
we need to argue that OPT(D̂) cannot be too much larger than OPT(D). Indeed, we relax OPT(D̂) to
OPT(D), and show that even the optimal revenue under the “best” distribution OPT(D) ≈ OPT(D). To do
so, we construct two auxiliary distributions P and Q, such that (i) OPT(P) ≈ OPT(Q); and (ii) P and D are
ε-close in Kolmogorov distance, and Q andD are ε-close also in Kolmogorov distance. Our robustness theorem
under Kolmogorov distance (Theorem 2) implies then that OPT(P) ≈ OPT(D) and OPT(Q) ≈ OPT(D).
Hence, OPT(D) ≈ OPT(D), which completes our proof.
Multi-item Robustness (Section 4) We first discuss our result for total variation distance. Unfortunately,
our approach for Le´vy distance—of simply choosing the optimal mechanism for the “worst,” in the first-
order stochastic dominance sense, distribution in the ε-TV-ball around D to be our robust mechanism—no
longer applies. Indeed, it is known that the optimal revenue in multi-item auctions may be non-monotone
with respect to first-order stochastic dominance [40], i.e. a distribution may be stochastically dominated by
another but result in higher revenue. However, ifD and D̂ are ε-close in total variation distance, this means
that there is a coupling between D and D̂ under which the valuation profiles are almost always sampled
6
the same. If we take the optimal mechanism M for D, and apply to bidders from D̂, it will produce almost
the same revenue under D̂, and vice versa. Indeed, the only event under which M may generate different
revenue under the two distributions is when the coupling samples different profiles, but this happens with
small probability. Similarly, the BIC and IR properties of M underD become slightly approximate under D̂.
We claim that we can massage M, in a way oblivious to D̂, to produce a (poly(n, m, H) · ε)-truthful and
exactly IR mechanism M̂ for D̂, which achieves an up-to-(poly(n, m, H) · ε) revenue (Theorem 3).
The main challenge is whenD and D̂ are only ε-close in Prokhorov distance. Note that two distributions
within Prokhorov distance ε may have total variation distance 1. Just imagine two point masses: one at A
and another at A− ε. So Prokhorov robustness is not directly implied by TV robustness.
Why Standard Discretization Arguments are Insufficient? Unlike standard algorithmic problems, dis-
cretization is subtle in mechanism design. Due to the presence of incentives, a small change in the bidders’
value distributions may change the distribution of outcomes of the mechanism dramatically. To perform
discretization in mechanism design, a standard procedure goes as follows [5, 36, 45]: let D̂ be the true dis-
tribution, and D be the distribution after discretization; design the optimal mechanism M for D; to run M
on a bid vector b from D̂, discretize it to γ(b) = (γ1(b1), . . . ,γn(bn)) and apply mechanism M on γ(b). This
procedure can be generalized to any pair of distributions D and D̂ as long as, we are given a coupling γ(·)
between D and D̂ that maps any bid vector b in the support of distribution D̂ to a bit vector γ(b) in the
support ofD. If for every bidder i, bi and γi(bi) are close with all but small probability, we can apply similar
arguments as in the total variation robustness result to massage the mechanism above to be nearly-truthful
and exactly IR for D̂, and argue it is approximately revenue optimal. Clearly, in the context of discretization,
bi and γi(bi) are guaranteed to be close if the discretization is sufficiently fine.
At first glance, this procedure may seem applicable to our problem. A characterization of Prokhorov
distance due to Strassen (Theorem 4) shows that: two distributions P and Q are ε-close in Prokhorov dis-
tance if and only if there exists a (potentially randomized) coupling γ such that if random variable s is
distributed according to P, then γ(s) is distributed according to Q and Pr [‖s− γ(s)‖1 > ε] ≤ ε. If M is the
optimal mechanism for the model distribution D, and D̂ is the true distribution that is ε-close to D, why
can’t we combine the procedure above with the coupling γ to establish our Prokhorov robustness result?
Unfortunately, this approach is insufficient due to the following two issues: (i) The procedure relies on
knowing the coupling γ. As we do not even know D̂, how can we know the coupling? (ii) Even if we
can identify the coupling γ between D and a specific D̂, the procedure above constructs a mechanism that
depends on the coupling γ. However, γ may change for every different D̂ in the ε-Prokhorov-ball around
D, so the procedure generates a different mechanism for every possible true distribution. 5
To satisfy our requirement for a robust mechanism in Goal III, we need to construct a single mechanism
that is nearly truthful, IR, and near-optimal simultaneously for every distribution in the ε-Prokhorov-ball
around D. Our proof relies on a novel way to “simultaneously couple” D with every distribution D̂ in the ε-
Prokhorov-ball around D. If we round both D and any D̂ to a random grid G with width√ε, we can argue
that the expected total variation distance (over the randomness of the grid) between the two rounded distribu-
tions DG and D̂G is O(
√
ε) (Lemma 7). Now consider the following mechanism: choose a random grid G,
round the bids to the random grid, apply the optimal mechanism MG that is designed for DG. Our robust-
ness result under the total variation distance implies that for every realization of the random grid G, MG is
O
(
poly(n, m, H) ·
∥∥∥DG − D̂G∥∥∥
TV
)
-truthful and up-to-O
(
poly(n, m, H) ·
∥∥∥DG − D̂G∥∥∥
TV
)
revenue optimal
for any D̂G. Since the expected value (over the randomness of the grid) of
∥∥∥DG − D̂G∥∥∥
TV
is O(
√
ε) for any D̂
in the ε-Prokhorov-ball ofD, our randomized mechanism is simultaneously O (poly(n, m, H) · √ε)-truthful
and up-to-O
(
poly(n, m, H) · √ε) revenue optimal for all distributions in the ε-Prokhorov-ball around D.6
5It is worth noting that the procedure can indeed be employed to prove the Prokhorov continuity, as the the pure existence of a
good coupling γ between D and D̂ suffices.
6Since we round the bids to a random grid, we will also need to accommodate the rounding error. Please see Theorem 5 for details.
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Sample Complexity Results In Section 5, we apply our robustness theorem to obtain sample bounds for
learning multi-item auctions under the item-independence assumption (Theorem 6). Our result provides
an alternative proof of the main result of [36]. In Section 7, we combine our robustness theorem with our
sample bounds for learning Markov Random Fields and Bayesian Networks discussed earlier to derive
new polynomial sample complexity results for learning multi-item auctions when the distributions have
structured correlation over the items. Theorem 7 summarizes our results when item values are generated
by an MRF, and Theorem 8 our results when item values are generated by a Bayesenet.
2 Preliminaries
We first define a series statistical distances that we will use in the paper and discuss their relationships.
Definition 1 (Statistical Distance). Let P and Q be two probability measures. We use ‖P−Q‖TV , ‖P−Q‖K, and
‖P−Q‖L to denote the total variational distance, the Kolmogorov distance, and the Le´vy distance between
P and Q, respectively. See Appendix B for more details. Prokhorov Distance is a generalization of the Le´vy
Distance to high dimensional distributions. Let (U, d) be a metric space and B be a σ-algebra on U. For A ∈ B, let
Aε = {x : ∃y ∈ A s.t d(x, y) < ε}. Then two measures P and Q on B have Prokhorov distance
inf {ε > 0 : P(A) ≤ Q(Aε) + ε, Q(A) ≤ P(Aε) + ε ∀A ∈ B}
We consider distributions supported on Rk for some k ∈ N, so U will be the k-dimensional Euclidean Space, and we
choose d to be the `1-distance. We denote the Prokhorov distance between distributions F , F̂ by
∥∥∥F − F̂∥∥∥
P
.
Relationships between the Statistical Distances: Among the four metrics, the Le´vy distance and the
Kolmogorov distance are only defined for single dimensional distributions, while the Prokhorov distance
and the total variation distance are defined for general distributions. In the single dimensional case, the
Le´vy distance is a very liberal metric. In particular, for any two single dimensional distributions P and Q,
‖P−Q‖L ≤ ‖P−Q‖K ≤ ‖P−Q‖TV .
Note that a robustness result for a more liberal metric is more general. For example, the robustness result
for single-item auctions under the Le´vy metric implies the robustness under the total variation and Kol-
mogorov metric, because the ε-ball in Le´vy distance contains the ε-ball in total variation and Kolmogorov
distance. An astute reader may wonder whether one can find a more liberal metric in the single dimen-
sional case. Interestingly, for the most common metrics studied probability theory, including the Wasser-
stein distance, the Hellinger distance, and the relative entropy, the Le´vy distance is the most liberal up to
a polynomial factor. That is, if the Le´vy distance is ε, the distance under any of these metrics is at least
poly(ε). Indeed, the polynomial is simply the identity function or the quadratic function ε2 in most cases.
Please see the survey by Gibbs and Su [33] and the references therein for more details.
The Prokhorov distance, also known as Le´vy-Prokhorov Distance, is the generalization of the Le´vy
distance to multi-dimensional distributions. It is also the standard metric in robust statistical decision
theory, see Huber [42] and Hampel et al. [38]. The Prokhorov distance is almost as liberal as the Le´vy
distance. 7 First, for any two distributions P and Q,
‖P−Q‖P ≤ ‖P−Q‖TV .
Second, if we consider other well studied metrics such as the Wasserstein distance, the Hellinger distance,
and the relative entropy, the Prokhorov distance is again the most liberal up to a polynomial factor.
Multi-item Auctions: We focus on revenue maximization in the combinatorial auction with n bidders
and m heterogenous items. We use X to denote the set of possible allocations, and each bidder i ∈ [n] has
a valuation function/type vi(·) : X 7→ R≥0. In this paper, we assume the function vi(·) is parametrized by
7Note that for single dimensional distributions, the Prokhorov distance is not equivalent to Le´vy distance. In particular,
‖P−Q‖L ≤ ‖P−Q‖P for any single dimensional distributions P and Q.
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(vi,1, . . . , vi,m), where vi,j is bidder i’s value for item j. We assume that bidder’s types are distributed indepen-
dently. Throughout this paper, we assume all bidders types lie in [0, H]m. We adopt the valuation model in
Gonczarowski and Weinberg [36] and consider valuations that satisfy the following Lipschitz property.
Definition 2 (Lipschitz Valuations). There exists an absolute constant L such that if type vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,m) and
v′i = (v
′
i,1, . . . , v
′
i,m) are within `1 distance ε, then for the corresponding valuations vi(·) and v′i(·), |vi(x)− v′i(x)| ≤L · ε for all x ∈ X.
This for example includes common settings such as additive and unit demand with Lipschitz constant
L = 1. More generally, L = 1 holds for constrained additive valuations 8 and even in some settings with
complementarities. Please see [36] for further discussion.
A mechanism M consists of an allocation rule x(·) and a payment rule p(·). For any input bids b =
(b1, . . . , bn), the allocation rule outputs a distribution over allocations x(b) ∈ ∆(X) and payments p(b) =
(p1(b), . . . , pn(b)). If bidder i’s type is vi, her utility under input b is ui (vi, M(b)) = E [vi (x(b))− pi(b)].
Truthfulness and Revenue: We use the standard notion ε-BIC and IR (see Appendix B for details). If M is
a ε-BIC mechanism w.r.t. some distribution D, we use REVT(M,D) to denote the revenue of mechanism M
under distribution D assuming bidders are bidding truthfully. Clearly, REVT(M,D) = REV(M,D) when
M is BIC w.r.t. D. We denote the optimal revenue achievable by any ε-BIC (or BIC) mechanism by OPTε(D)
(or OPT(D)). Although it is conceivable that permitting mechanisms to be ε-BIC allows for much greater
expected revenue than if they were restricted to be BIC, past results show that this is not the case.
Lemma 1. [27, 53] In any n-bidder m-item auction, let D be any joint distribution over arbitrary L-Lipschitz
valuations, where the valuations of different bidders are independent. The maximum revenue attainable by any IR and
ε-BIC auction for a given product distribution is at most 2n
√
mLHε greater than the maximum revenue attainable
by any IR and BIC auction for that distribution.
Notations: We allow the bidders to submit a special type ⊥, which represents not participating the auc-
tion. If anyone submits ⊥, the mechanism terminates immediately, and does not allocate any item to any
bidder or charge any bidder. A bidder’s utility for submitting type ⊥ is 0. We will sometimes refer to ⊥
as the IR type.Throughout the paper, we use D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i to denote the true type distributions of the bid-
ders. We use D =×ni=1Di to denote the model type distributions or our learned type distributions from
samples. We use Di |×mj=1[wij, wij + δ) to denote the distribution induced by Di conditioned on being in
the m-dimensional cube×mj=1[wij, wij + δ), and supp(F ) to denote the support of distribution F .
3 Le´vy-Robustness for Single-Item Auctions
In this section, we show the robustness result under the Le´vy distance in the single-item setting. If we are
given a model distribution Di that is ε-close to the true distribution D̂i, in Le´vy distance, for every bidder
i ∈ [n], we show how to design a mechanism M∗ only based on D =×ni=1Di and extracts revenue that is
at most O(nH · ε) less than the optimal revenue under any possible true distribution D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i.
Theorem 1 (Le´vy-Robustness for Single-item Auctions). Given D =×ni=1Di, where Di is an arbitrary distri-
butions supported on [0, H] for all i ∈ [n]. We can design a DSIC and IR mechanism M∗ based on D such that for
any product distribution D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i satisfying ∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥L ≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], we have:
REV(M∗, D̂) ≥ OPT(D̂)−O(nH · ε).
Let us sketch the proof of Theorem 1. We prove our statement in three steps.
• Step (i): We first identify the “best” and “worst” distributions (Definition 3), in terms of the first-order
stochastic dominance (Definition 4), among all distributions in the ε-Le´vy-ball around the model dis-
tribution D. We construct the optimal mechanism M∗ w.r.t. the “worst” distribution, and show that
8vi(·) is constrained additive if vi(X) = maxR⊆S,R∈I ∑j∈R vi,j, for some downward closed set system I ⊆ 2[m] and S = {j : xi,j = 1}.
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its revenue under any possible true distribution is at least M∗’s revenue under the “worst” distribu-
tion (Lemma 4). The statement provides a lower bound of M∗’s revenue under the unknown true
distribution. Its proof follows from the revenue monotonicity lemma (Lemma 3) shown in [28].
• Step (ii): We use the revenue monotonicity lemma again to show the optimal revenue under the true
distribution D̂ is upper bounded by the optimal revenue under the “best” distribution(Lemma 5).
• Step (iii): We complete the proof by argueing that M∗’s revenue under the “worst” distribution can
be at most O(nH · ε) worst than the optimal revenue under the “best” distribution (Lemma 6). The
statement follows from a robustness theorem for single-item auctions under the Kolmogorov distance
(Theorem 2).
We show Step (i) and (ii) in Section 3.1 and Step (iii) in Section 3.2.
3.1 Best and Worst Distributions in the ε-Le´vy-Ball
We formally define the “best” and “worst” distributions in the ε-Le´vy-ball around the model distribution.
Definition 3. For every i ∈ [n], we define Di and Di based on Di. Di is supported on [0, H + ε], and its CDF
is defined as FDi (x) = max
{
FDi (x− ε)− ε, 0
}
. Di is supported on [−ε, H], and its CDF is defined as FDi (x) =
min
{
FDi (x + ε) + ε, 1
}
.
We provide a more intuitive interpretation of Di and Di here. To obtain Di, we first shift all values in
Di to the right by ε, then we move the bottom ε probability mass to H + ε. To obtain Di, we first shift all
values in Di to the left by ε, then we move the top ε probability mass to −ε. It is not hard to see that both
Di and Di are still in the ε-ball around Di in Le´vy distance. More importantly, Di and Di are the “best” and
“worst” distributions in the ε-Le´vy-ball under first-order-stochastic-dominance.
Definition 4 (First-Order Stochastic Dominance). We say distribution B first-order stochastically dominates
A iff FB(x) ≤ FA(x) for all x ∈ R. We use A 4 B to denote that distribution B first-order stochastically dominates
distribution A. If A = ×ni=1 Ai and B = ×ni=1Bi are two product distributions, and Ai 4 Bi for all i ∈ [n], we
slightly abuse the notation 4 to write A 4 B.
Lemma 2. For any D̂i, such that
∥∥∥D̂i −Di∥∥∥
L
≤ ε, we have Di 4 D̂i 4 Di.
Proof. It follows from the definition of Le´vy distance and Definition 3. For any x,
FD̂i (x) ∈ [FDi (x− ε)− ε, FDi (x + ε) + ε].
Clearly, 0 ≤ FD̂i (x) ≤ 1, so we have FDi (x) ≤ FD̂i (x) ≤ FDi (x) for all x.
The plan is to construct the optimal mechanism for D = ×ni=1Di and show that this mechanism
achieves up-to-O(nH · ε) optimal revenue under any possible true distribution D.
Next, we state a revenue monotonicity lemma that will be useful. We first need the following definition.
Definition 5 (Extension of a Mechanism to All Values). Suppose a mechanism M = (x, p) is defined for all value
profiles in T = ×ni=1Ti. Define its extension M′ = (x′, p′) to all values. We only specify x′, as p′ can be determined
by the payment identity given x′. x′ first rounds the bid of each bidder i down to the closest value in Ti, and then
apply allocation rule x on the rounded bids. If some bidder i’s bid is smaller than the lowest value in Ti, x′ does not
allocate the item to any bidder.
Observe that the extension provides a DSIC and IR mechanism for all values if the original mechanism
is DSIC and IR.
Lemma 3 (Strong Revenue Monotonicity [28]). Let F =×ni=1 Fi be a product distributions. There exists an
optimal DSIC and IR mechanism M for F such that, for any product distribution F ′ =×ni=1 F ′i < F ,
REV(M′,F ′) ≥ REV(M,F ) = OPT(F ).
M′ is the extension of M. In particular, this implies OPT(F ′) ≥ OPT(F ).
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Combining Lemma 2 and 3, we show that if M∗ is the extension of the optimal mechanism for D, it
achieves at least OPT(D) under any distribution D̂ with
∥∥∥D̂i −Di∥∥∥
L
≤ ε.
Lemma 4. Let M∗ be the extension of the optimal DSIC and IR mechanism for D. For any product distribution
D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i with ∥∥∥D̂i −Di∥∥∥L ≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], we have the following:
REV(M∗, D̂) ≥ OPT(D).
Proof. Since D̂ < D (Lemma 2), the claim follows from Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 shows that with only knowledge of the model distribution D, we can design a mechanism
whose revenue under any possible true distribution D̂ is at least OPT(D). Next, we upper bound the
optimal revenue under D̂ with the optimal revenue under D.
Lemma 5. For any product distribution D̂ with
∥∥∥D̂i −Di∥∥∥
L
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], we have the following:
OPT(D) ≥ OPT(D̂).
Proof. Since D < D̂ (Lemma 2), the claim follows from Lemma 3.
3.2 Comparing the Revenue of the Best and Worst Distributions
In this section, we show that our lower bound of M∗’s revenue under the true distribution D̂ and our upper
bound of the optimal revenue under D̂ are at most O(nH · ε) away.
Lemma 6.
OPT(D) ≥ OPT(D)−O(nH · ε).
It is a priori not clear why Lemma 6 should be true, as D is the “best” distribution and D is the “worst”
distribution in the ε-Le´vy-ball around D. We prove Lemma 6 by introducing another two auxiliary distri-
butions D˜ and D˜. In particular, we construct D˜i by shifting all values in Di to the right by ε, and construct
D˜i by shifting all values inDi to the left by ε. There are two important properties of these two new distribu-
tions: (i) one can couple D˜i with D˜i so that the two random variables are always exactly 2ε away from each
other; (ii) D˜i and Di are within Kolmogorov distance ε, and D˜i and Di are also within Kolmogorov distance
ε. Property (i) allows us to prove that
∣∣∣OPT(D˜)−OPT(D˜)∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε (see Claim 2). To make use of property (ii),
we prove the following robustness theorem w.r.t. the Kolmogorov distance.
Theorem 2. For any buyer i ∈ [n], let Di and D̂i be two arbitrary distributions supported on (−∞, H] such that∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
K
≤ ε. We have the following:
OPT
(
D̂
)
≥ OPT(D)− 3nH · ε.
where D =×ni=1Di and D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i.
The proof of Theorem 2 is postponed to Appendix C. Equipped with Theorem 2, we can immediately
show that |OPT(D˜)−OPT(D)| ≤ O(nH · ε) and
∣∣∣OPT(D˜)−OPT(D)∣∣∣ ≤ O(nH · ε). Lemma 6 follows
quite easily from Claim 2 and the two inequalities above. The complete proof of Lemma 6 can be found in
Appendix C.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: We first construct D based on D and let M∗ be the extension of the optimal mechanism
for D. By Lemma 4, we know REV(M∗, D̂) is at least OPT(D) for any D̂. We also know that the optimal
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revenue under D̂ is at most OPT(D) by Lemma 5, and OPT(D) ≤ OPT(D) + O(nH · ε) by Lemma 6.
Therefore,
REV(M∗, D̂) ≥ OPT(D)−O(nH · ε) ≥ OPT(D̂)−O(nH · ε).
2
A simple corollary of Theorem 1 is the continuity of the optimal revenue under Le´vy distance in single-
item settings.
Corollary 1. If Di and D̂i are supported on [0, H], and
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
L
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], then∣∣∣OPT(D)−OPT(D̂)∣∣∣ ≤ O (nH · ε) ,
where D =×ni=1Di and D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i.
4 Robustness for Multi-item Auctions
In this section, we prove our robustness results under the total variation distance and the Prokhorov dis-
tance in multi-item settings. As discussed in Section 1.2, the proof strategy for single-item auctions fails
miserably in multi-item settings due to the lack of structure of the optimal mechanism. In particular, one
of the crucial tools we relied on in single-item settings, the revenue monotonicity, no longer holds in multi-
item settings [40]. Nevertheless, we still manage to provide robustness guarantees in multi-item auctions.
The plan is to first prove the robustness result under the total variation distance in Section 4.1, then we
show show to relate the Prokhorov distance with the total variation distance using randomized rounding
in Section 4.2, and reduce the robustness under the Prokhorov distance to the robustness under the total
variation distance in Section 4.3.
4.1 TV-Robustness for Multi-item Auctions
Theorem 3 (TV-Robustness for Multi-item Auctions). Given any distribution D =×ni=1Di, where each Di is a
distribution supported on [0, H]m, and a η-BIC and IR mechanism M w.r.t. D, we can construct a mechanism M̂ such
that for any distribution D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i ∈ [0, H]nm, if we let εi = ∥∥∥D̂i −Di∥∥∥TV for all i ∈ [n] and ρ = ∑i∈[n] εi,
then M̂ is 2mLHρ+ η-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Moreover, REVT(M̂, D̂) ≥ REVT(M,D)− nmLHρ. Note that our
construction of M̂ only depends on D and does not require any knowledge of D̂.
We briefly describe the ideas behind the proof. If D̂ and D share the same support, it is not hard to
see that M is already (2mLHρ+ η)-BIC w.r.t. D̂. The reason is that for any bidder i and any type vi, her
expected utility under any report can change by at most mLHρ when the other bidders’ bids are drawn
from D̂−i rather than D−i, as
∥∥∥D̂j −Dj∥∥∥
TV
= ε j for all j ∈ [n]. The bulk of the proof is dedicated to the
case, where D̂ and D have different supports. We construct mechanism M̂, which first takes each bidder i’s
report and maps it to the “best” possible report from supp(Di), then runs essentially M on the transformed
reports. We show that M̂ is 2mLHρ+ η-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and generates at most nmLHρ less revenue. The proof
of Theorem 3 is postponed to Appendix D.1.
4.2 Connecting the Prokhorov Distance with the Total Variation Distance
In this section, we provide a randomized rounding scheme that relates the Prokhorov distance to the total
variation distance. We first state a characterization of the Prokhorov distance due to Strassen [54] that is
useful for our analysis.
Theorem 4 (Characterization of the Prokhorov Metric [54]). Let F and F̂ be two distributions supported onRk.∥∥∥F − F̂∥∥∥
P
≤ ε if and only if there exists a coupling γ of F and F̂ , such that Pr(x,y)∼γ [d(x, y) > ε] ≤ ε, where
d(·, ·) is the `1 distance.
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Theorem 4 states that F and F̂ are within Prokhorov distance ε of each other if and only if there exists a
coupling between the two distributions such that the two random variables are within ε of each other with
probability at least 1− ε. Next, we show that if F and F̂ are close to each other in Prokhorov distance, then
one can use a randomized rounding scheme to round both F and F̂ to discrete distributions so that the two
rounded distributions are close in total variation distance with high probability.
First, let us fix some notations.
Definition 6 (Rounded Distribution). Let F be a distribution supported on Rk≥0. For any δ > 0 and ` ∈ [0, δ]k,
we define function r(`,δ) : Rk≥0 7→ Rk as follows: r(`,δ)i (x) = max
{⌊
xi−`i
δ
⌋
· δ+ `i, 0
}
for all i ∈ [k]. Let X be a
random variable sampled from distribution F . We define bFc`,δ as the distribution for the random variable r(`,δ)(X),
and we call bFc`,δ as the rounded distribution of F .
Lemma 7. Let F and F̂ be two distributions supported on Rk, and
∥∥∥F − F̂∥∥∥
P
≤ ε. For any δ > 0, sample ` from
the uniform distribution over [0, δ]k, E`∼U[0,δ]k
[∥∥∥∥bFc`,δ − ⌊F̂⌋`,δ
∥∥∥∥
TV
]
≤
(
1+ 1δ
)
ε.
We only sketch the idea and postpone the formal proof to Appendix D.2. Let x be a random variable
sampled from F and y be a random variable sampled from F̂ . Since F and F̂ are close in Prokhorov
distance, we can couple x and y according to Theorem 4 such that they are within ε of each other with
probability at least 1− ε. The rounding scheme chooses a random origin ` from [0, δ]k and rounds F and
F̂ to the corresponding random grid with width δ. More specifically, we round F and F̂ to bFc`,δ and⌊
F̂
⌋
`,δ
respectively. For simplicity, consider δ = Θ(
√
ε). The key observation is that when x and y are
within `1-distance ε of each other, they lie in the same grid with probability at least 1−O(
√
ε) over the
randomness of `. If x and y are in the same grid, they will be rounded to the same point. In other words,
the coupling between x and y induces a coupling between bFc`,δ and
⌊
F̂
⌋
`,δ
such that, in expectation
over the choice of `, the event that the corresponding two rounded random variables have different values
happens with probability at most ε+ (1− ε) ·O(√ε) = O(√ε). By the definition of total variation distance,
this implies that the expected total variation distance between bFc`,δ and
⌊
F̂
⌋
`,δ
is also at most O(
√
ε). A
similar argument applies to other choices of δ.
4.3 Prokhorov-Robustness for Multi-item Auctions
In this section, we show that even in multi-item settings, if every bidder’s approximate type distributionDi
is within Prokhorov distance ε of her true type distribution D̂i, given any BIC and IR mechanism M forD =×ni=1Di, we can construct a mechanism M̂ that is O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε))-BIC w.r.t. D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i, IR, and its
revenue under truthful bidding REVT(M̂, D̂) is at most O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε)) worse than REV(M,D).
Theorem 5. Suppose we are given D =×ni=1Di, where Di is an m-dimensional distribution for each i ∈ [n], and
a BIC and IR mechanism M w.r.t. D. Suppose D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i is the true but unknown type distribution such that∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n]. We can construct a randomized mechanism M̂, oblivious to the true distribution D̂,
such that for any D̂ the followings hold:
1. M̂ is κ-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR, where κ = O
(
nmLHε+ mL√nHε
)
;
2. the expected revenue of M̂ under truthful bidding is REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ REV(M,D)−O (nκ) .
We postpone the formal proof of Theorem 5 to Appendix D.3. We provide a complete sketch here. Our
construction consist of the following five steps.
• Step (1): After receiving the bid profile, first sample ` from U[0, δ]m. For every realization of `, we
construct a mechanism M̂(`) and execute M̂(`) on the reported bids. In the next several steps, we
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show how to construct M̂(`) via two intermediate mechanisms M(`)1 and M
(`)
2 for every realization of
` based on M. Since ` is a random variable, M̂ is a randomized mechanism.
• Step (2): Round Di to bDic`,δ for every bidder i. We construct mechanism M(`)1 based on M and show
that M(`)1 is O(mLδ)-BIC w.r.t.×ni=1 bDic`,δ and IR. Moreover,
REVT
(
M(`)1 ,
n×
i=1
bDic`,δ
)
≥ REV(M,D)−O(nmLδ).
Here is the idea behind the construction: for any bidder i and type wi drawn from bDic`,δ, we resample
a type fromDi |×mj=1[wij, wij + δ), which is the distribution induced byDi conditioned on being in the
cube×mj=1[wij, wij + δ). We use the allocation rule of M and a slightly modified payment rule on the
resampled type profile. This guarantees that the new mechanism is O(mLδ)-BIC w.r.t.×ni=1 bDic`,δ
and IR. The formal statement and analysis are shown in Lemma 8.
• Step (3): We use ε(`)i to denote
∥∥∥∥bDic`,δ − ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ
∥∥∥∥
TV
for our sample ` and every i ∈ [n], and ρ(`)
to denote ∑i∈[n] ε
(`)
i . We transform M
(`)
1 into a new mechanism M
(`)
2 using Theorem 3. In par-
ticular, M(`)2 is O
(
mLδ+ mLH · ρ(`)
)
-BIC w.r.t. ×ni=1 ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ and IR. Importantly, the construc-
tion of M(`)2 is oblivious to×ni=1 ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ and {ε(`)i }i∈[n]. Moreover, REVT
(
M(`)2 ,×ni=1 ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ
)
≥
REVT
(
M(`)1 ,×ni=1 bDic`,δ)−O (nmLH · ρ(`)) .
• Step (4): We convert M(`)2 to M̂(`) so that it is O
(
mLδ+ mLH · ρ(`)
)
-BIC w.r.t. D̂, IR and
REVT(M̂(`), D̂) ≥ REVT
(
M(`)2 ,
n×
i=1
⌊
D̂i
⌋
`,δ
)
− nmLδ.
Here is the idea behind the construction of M̂(`): for every bidder i and her type wi drawn from D̂i,
round it to r(`,δ)i (wi) (see Definition 6). We use the allocation rule of M
(`)
2 and a slightly modified pay-
ment rule on the rounded type profile. This guarantees that the new mechanism is O
(
mLδ+ mLH · ρ(`)
)
-
BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Note that our construction only requires knowledge of M(`)2 , `, and δ, and is com-
pletely oblivious to D̂ and×ni=1 ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ. The formal statement and analysis are shown in Lemma 9.
• Step (5): Since for every realization of `, M̂(`) is O
(
mLδ+ mLH · ρ(`)
)
-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR, M̂ must be
O
(
mLδ+ mLH ·E`∼U[0,δ]m
[
ρ(`)
])
-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. According to Lemma 7, E`∼U[0,δ]m
[
ρ(`)
]
=
∑i∈[n]E`∼U[0,δ]m
[
ε
(`)
i
]
= n ·
(
1+ 1δ
)
ε. Therefore, M̂ is
O
(
mLδ+ nmLH
(
1+ 1δ
)
e
)
-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Moreover,
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ REV(M,D)−O
(
nmLδ+ n2mLH
(
1+
1
δ
)
ε
)
.
Lemma 8. Given any δ > 0, ` ∈ [0, δ]m, and a BIC and IR mechanism M w.r.t. D, we can construct a ξ1 =
O(mLδ)-BIC w.r.t. D =×ni=1 bDic`,δ and IR mechanism M(`)1 , such that
REVT
(
M(`)1 ,D
)
≥ REV(M,D)− nmLδ.
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The proof of Lemma 8 can be found in Appendix D.3. In the next Lemma, we make Step (4) formal.
Lemma 9. For any δ > 0, ` ∈ [0, δ]m, and distribution D̂, if M(`)2 is a ξ2-BIC w.r.t. D̂ =×ni=1 ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ and IR
mechanism, we can transform M(`)2 into a mechanism M̂
(`), so that M̂ is (ξ2 + 3mLδ)-BIC w.r.t. D̂, IR, and has
revenue under truthful bidding REVT
(
M̂(`), D̂
)
≥ REVT
(
M(`)2 , D̂
)
− nmLδ. Moreover, the transformation does
not rely on any knowledge of D̂ or D̂.
The proof of Lemma 9 is postpone to Appendix D.3.
4.4 Applications of Multi-Item Robustness
Lipschitz Continuity of the Optimal Revenue in Multi-item Auctions. Equipped with Theorem 3 and 5,
we can easily argue the Lipschitz continuity of the optimal revenue in multi-item auctions (Theorem 11) as
stated in the last column of the second half of Table 1. Due to Theorem 3 and 5, we know that the optimal
revenue of a O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε))-BIC and IR mechanism w.r.t. distribution F =×i∈[n] Fi is at least as
large as the optimal revenue of a BIC and IR mechanism w.r.t. distribution F̂ =×i∈[n] F̂i, if ∥∥∥Fi − F̂i∥∥∥TV ≤
ε, ∀i or
∥∥∥Fi − F̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ ε, ∀i. According to Lemma 1, the optimal revenue of a O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε))-BIC and
IR mechanism is at most O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε)) larger than the optimal revenue of a BIC and IR mechanism.
Hence, OPT(F ) ≈ OPT(F̂ ). Please see Appendix D.4 for the formal statement and the proof of Theorem 11.
Approximation Preserving Transformation. One interesting implication of Theorem 11 is that the trans-
formations of Theorems 3 and 5 are also approximation preserving. Given a a c-approximation mechanism
M to the optimal revenue under distribution D, applying the transformation in Theorem 5 (or Theorem 3)
to M, we obtain a new mechanism M̂ that is O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε))-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR if
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ ε, ∀i
(or if
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
TV
≤ ε, ∀i ). Moreover, its revenue under truthful bidding is at least c fraction of the opti-
mal O(poly(n, m,L, H, ε))-BIC revenue under D̂ less a small additive term. The result is formally stated as
Theorem 12 in Appendix D.5. Note that the third column of the second half of Table 1 is simply Theorem 12
with c = 1. Furthermore, if there is only a single bidder, the mechanism M̂ becomes exactly IC instead of
approximately IC (Theorem 13).
Learning Multi-item Auctions under Item Independence. Since independent distributions are straight-
forward to learn within Prokhorov distance ε with polynomially many samples, the result of Gonczarowski
and Weinberg [36] follows easily from our robustness result (see Theorem 6 in Appendix 5).
Learning Multi-item Auctions under Structured Item Dependence. Going beyond product measures,
we initiate the study of learning multi-item auctions when every bidder’s item-values are dependent, but
sampled from a joint distribution with structure. As we have already noted, arbitrary joint distributions
are both unnatural from a modeling perspective, as they require exponentially many bits to describe, and
are also known to require exponentially many samples to even learn approximately optimal auctions [31].
We thus propose studying the learnability of auctions under the assumption that each bidder’s item values
are sampled from a Markov Random Field (MRF) or a Bayesian network (a.k.a. Bayeset). In fact, this is
not really an assumption. These well-studied probabilistic frameworks, defined formally in Definitions 7
and 8 of Appendix 7 due to lack of space, are very flexible in that they can represent any distribution. The
reason they are attractive from a modeling perspective is that they have a natural complexity parameter
that controls how expressive they are, namely the maximum hyperedge size of an MRF and the maximum
in-degree of a Bayesnet. Under the assumption that each bidder’s item-values are drawn from an MRF or a
Bayesnet of complexity d, we establish the results summarized in the last two rows of Table 2, whose main
feature is that the sample complexity to learn an up-to-e optimal auction is polynomial in the number of
bidders n, the number of items m, the inverse approximation parameter 1/ε, and other relevant parameters,
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and is only exponential in the complexity parameter d of the bidders’ MRFs or Bayesian networks, as it
should given the known lower bounds [31].
Our results for learning near-optimal auctions under MRF and Bayesnet assumptions are stated in more
detail as Theorems 7 and 8 of Appendix 7, and can also accommodate unobservable variables which makes their
applicability very broad. In turn, these results are proven by combining our robustness result (Theorem 12)
with new learnability results for MRFs and Bayesnets that we also establish, namely Theorems 9 and 10
of Appendix 7 respectively. These results are of independent interest and provide broad generalizations
of the recent upper bounds of [30] for Gaussian MRFs and Ising models. While this recent work bounds
the VC dimension of the Yatracos class of these families of distributions, for our more general families of
non-parametric distributions we construct instead covers under either total variation distance or Prokhorov
distance, and combine our cover-size upper bounds with generic tournament-style algorithms; see e.g. [29,
26, 1]. The details are provided in Appendix F. While there are many details, we illustrate one snippet of
an idea used in constructing a ε-cover, in total variation distance, of the set of all MRFs with hyper-edges
E of size at most d and a discrete alphabet Σ on every node. The proof argues that (i) the (appropriately
normalized) log-potential functions of the MRF can be discretized to take values in the negative integers
at a cost of ε in total variation distance; (ii) using properties of linear programming, it argues that using
negative integers of bit complexity polynomial in |E|, |Σ|d and log(1/ε) suffices at another cost of ε in
total variation distance. It thus argues that all MRFs can be covered by a set of MRFs of size exponential
in poly
(
|E|, |Σ|d, log( 1ε )
)
, which is sufficient to yield the required sample bounds using the tournament
algorithm.
5 Learning Multi-item Auctions under Item Independence
In this section, we show how to derive one of the state-of-the-art learnability results for learning multi-item
auctions via our robustness results. We consider the case where every bidder’s type distribution is a m-
dimensional product distribution. We will show that a generalization of the main result by Gonczarowski
and Weinberg [36] follows easily from our robustness result. The main idea is that it suffices to learn the
distribution Fi within small Prokhorov distance for every bidder i, and it only requires polynomial many
samples when each Fi is a product distribution.
Theorem 6. Consider the general mechanism design setting of Section 2. Recall that L is the Lipschitz constant
of the valuations. For every ε, δ > 0, and for every η ≤ poly(n, m,L, H, ε), we can learn a distribution D =×i∈[n],j∈[m]Dij with poly (n, m,L, H, 1/ε, 1/η, log(1/δ)) samples from D̂ =×i∈[n],j∈[m] D̂ij, such that, with
probability 1− δ, we can transform any BIC w.r.t. D, IR, and c-approximation mechanism M to an η-BIC w.r.t. D̂
and IR mechanism M̂, whose revenue under truthful bidding satisfies
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
− ε.
If n = 1, the mechanism M̂ will be IR and IC, and
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c · (1−√η) ·OPT
(
D̂
)
− ε−√η.
In particular, Gonczarowski and Weinberg [36] proved the c = 1 case, and our result applies to any c ∈
(0, 1]. The proof is given in Appendix E. We provide a proof sketch here. We first prove Lemma 12, which
shows that polynomially many samples suffice to learn a distribution D that is close to D̂ in Prokhorov
distance. Now the statement simply follows from Theorem 12.
6 Missing Proofs from Section 5
We first show that for any product distribution F , we can learn the rounded distribution of F within small
TV distance with polynomially many samples.
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Lemma 10. Let F =×mj=1 Fj, where Fj is an arbitrary distribution supported on [0, H] for every j ∈ [m]. Given
N = O
(
m3 H
η3
· (log 1/δ+ log m)
)
samples, we can learn a product distribution F̂ =×mj=1 F̂j such that∥∥∥F − F̂∥∥∥
P
≤ η
with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. We denote the samples as s1, . . . , sN . Round each sample to multiples of η′ = η/m. More specif-
ically, let sˆi =
(⌊
si1/η
′⌋ · η′, . . . , ⌊sim/η′⌋ · η′) for every sample i ∈ [N]. Let F̂j be the uniform distribu-
tion over sˆ1j , . . . , sˆ
N
j . Let F j =
⌊Fj⌋0,η′ . Note that F̂j is the empirical distribution of N samples from
F j. As
∣∣supp(F j)∣∣ = ⌊ Hη′ ⌋ = mHη , with N = O( |supp(F j)|η′2 · (log 1/δ+ log m)) samples, the empirical
distribution F̂j should satisfy
∥∥∥F̂j −F j∥∥∥
TV
≤ η′ with probability at least 1− δ/m. By the union bound∥∥∥F̂j −F j∥∥∥
TV
≤ η′ for all j ∈ [m] with probability at least 1− δ, which implies
∥∥∥F̂ − F∥∥∥
TV
≤ η with prob-
ability at least 1− δ. Observe that F and F can be coupled so that the two samples are always within η
in `1 distance. When
∥∥∥F̂ − F∥∥∥
TV
≤ η, consider the coupling between F̂ and F by composing the optimal
coupling between F̂ and F and the coupling between F and F . Clearly, the two samples from F̂ and F
are within `1 distance η with probability at least 1− η. Due to Theorem 4, the existence of this coupling
implies that
∥∥∥F̂ − F∥∥∥
P
≤ η.
Proof of Theorem 6: We only consider the case, where η ≤ α ·min
{
ε
n ,
ε2
n2mLH
}
. α is an absolute constant and
we will specify its choice in the end of the proof.
In light of Lemma 12, we take N = O
(
m3 H
σ3
· (log nδ + log m)
)
from D̂ and learn a distribution D so that,
with probability at least 1− δ,
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ σ for all i ∈ [n]. According to Theorem 12, we can transform
M into mechanism M̂ that is O
(
nmLHσ+ mL√nHσ
)
-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Choose σ in a way so that M̂ is
η-BIC w.r.t. D̂. Moreover, M̂’s revenue under truthful bidding satisfies
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
−O
(
nη + n
√
mLHη
)
.
If we choose α to be sufficiently small, then
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
− ε.
When there is only a single-bidder, we can apply Lemma 11 to transform M̂ to an IC and IR mechanism,
whose revenue satisfies the guarantee in the statement.2
7 Optimal Mechanism Design under Structural Item Dependence
In this section, we go beyond the standard assumption of item-independence, which has been employed
in most of prior literature, to consider settings where, as is commonly the case in practice, item values are
correlated. Of course, once we embark onto a study of correlated distributions, we should not go all the
way to full generality, since exponential sample-size lower bounds are known, even for learning approxi-
mately optimal mechanisms in single-bidder unit-demand settings [31]. Besides those sample complexity
lower bounds, however, fully general distributions are also not very natural. In practice, high-dimensional
distributions are not arbitrary, but have structure, which allows us to perform inference on them and learn
them more efficiently. We thus propose the study of optimal mechanism design under the assumption that
item values are jointly sampled from a high-dimensional distribution with structure.
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There are many probabilistic frameworks that allow modeling structure in a high-dimensional distribu-
tion. In this work we consider one of the most prominent ones: graphical models, and in particular consider
the two most common types of graphical models: Markov Random Fields and Bayesian Networks.
Definition 7. A Markov Random Field (MRF) is a distribution defined by a hypergraph G = (V, E). Associated
with every vertex v ∈ V is a random variable Xv taking values in some alphabet Σ, as well as a potential function
ψv : Σ → [0, 1]. Associated with every hyperedge e ⊆ V is a potential function ψe : Σe → [0, 1]. In terms of these
potentials, we define a probability distribution p associating to each vector x ∈ ΣV probability p(x) satisfying:
p(x) =
1
Z ∏v∈V
ψv(xv)∏
e∈E
ψe(xe), (1)
where for a set of nodes e and a vector x we denote by xe the restriction of x to the nodes in e, and Z is a normalization
constant making sure that p, as defined above, is a distribution. In the degenerate case where the products on the
RHS of (1) always evaluate to 0, we assume that p is the uniform distribution over ΣV . In that case, we get the same
distribution by assuming that all potential functions are identically 1. Hence, we can in fact assume that the products
on the RHS of (1) cannot always evaluate to 0.
Definition 8. A Bayesian network, or Bayesnet, specifies a probability distribution in terms of a directed acyclic
graph G whose nodes V are random variables taking values in some alphabet Σ. To describe the probability distribu-
tion, one specifies conditional probabilities pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv), for all vertices v in G, and configurations xv ∈ Σ and
xΠv ∈ ΣΠv , where Πv represents the set of parents of v in G, taken to be ∅ if v has no parents. In terms of these
conditional probabilities, a probability distribution over ΣV is defined as follows:
p(x) =∏
v
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv), for all x ∈ Σ
V .
It is important to note that both MRFs and Bayesnets allow the study of distributions in their full gen-
erality, as long as the graphs on which they are defined are sufficiently dense. In particular, the graph
(hypergraph and DAG respectively) underlying these models captures conditional independence relations,
and is sufficiently flexible to capture the structure of intricate dependencies in the data. As such these mod-
els have found myriad applications; see e.g. [43, 50, 51, 44] and their references. A common way to control
the expressiveness of MRFs and Bayesnets is to vary the maximum size of hyperedges in an MRF and inde-
gree in a Bayesnet. Our sample complexity results presented below will be parametrized according to this
measure of complexity in the distributions.
In our results, presented below, we exploit our modular framework to disentangle the identification
of good mechanisms for these settings from the intricacies of learning a good model of the underlying
distribution from samples. In particular, we are able to pair our mechanism design framework presented
in earlier sections with learning results for MRFs and Bayesnets to characterize the sample complexity of
learning good mechanisms when the item distributions are MRFs and Bayesnets. Below, we first present our
results on the sample complexity of learning good mechanisms in these settings, followed by the learning
results for MRFs and Bayesnets that these are modularly dependent on.
7.1 Learning Multi-item Auctions under Structural Item Dependence
In this section, we state our results for learning multi-item auctions when each bidder’s values correlated.
In particular, we consider two cases: (i) every bidder’s type is sampled from an MRF, or (ii) every bid-
der’s type is sampled from a Bayesnet. Our results can accommodate latent variables, that is, some of the
variables/nodes of the MRF or Bayesnet are not observable in the samples. We show that the sample com-
plexity for learning an η-BIC and IR mechanism, whose revenue is at most ε less than the optimal revenue
achievable by any η-BIC and IR mechanisms, is polynomial in the size of the problem and scales gracefully
with the parameters of the graphical models that generate the type distributions. If there is only a single
bidder, the mechanism we learn will be exactly IC rather than approximately IC. We derive the sample com-
plexity by combining our robustness result (Theorem 12) with learnability results for MRFs and Bayesnets
(Theorem 9 and 10).
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Theorem 7 (Optimal Mechanism Design under MRF Item Distributions). Consider the general mechanism
design setting of Section 2. Recall that L is the Lipschitz constant of the valuations. Let D̂ =×i∈[n] D̂i, where each
D̂i is a m-dimensional distribution generated by an MRF pi, as in Definition 7, defined on a graph with Ni ≥ m
nodes, hyper-edges of size at most d, and supp(D̂i) ⊆ Σm ⊆ [0, H]m. When Ni > m, we say D̂i is generated by an
MRF with Ni −m latent variables. We use N to denote maxi∈[n]{Ni}.
For every ε, δ > 0, and η ≤ poly(n, m,L, H, ε), we can learn, with probability at least 1− δ, an η-BIC w.r.t. D̂
and IR mechanism M̂, whose revenue under truthful bidding is at most ε smaller than the optimal revenue achievable
by any η-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR mechanism, given
• poly(n,N
d ,|Σ|d ,L,H,1/η,log(1/δ))
ε4
samples if the alphabet Σ is finite; when the graph on which pi is defined is
known for each bidder i, then
poly(n,N,κ,|Σ|d ,L,H,1/η,log(1/δ))
ε4
-many samples suffice, where κ is an upper bound
on the number of edges in all the graphs;
• poly
(
n, Nd
2
,
(
H
ε
)d
, Cd,L, 1/η, log(1/δ)
)
samples if the alphabet Σ = [0, H], and the log potentials
φ
pi
v (·) ≡ log
(
ψ
pi
v (·)
)
and φpie (·) ≡ log
(
ψ
pi
e (·)
)
for every node v and every edge e are C-Lipschitz w.r.t.
the `1-norm, for every bidder i; when the graph on which pi is defined is known for each bidder i, then
poly
(
n, N, κd,
(
H
ε
)d
, Cd,L, 1/η, log(1/δ)
)
-many samples suffice, where κ is an upper bound on the number
of edges in all the graphs.
If n = 1, the mechanism M̂ will be IR and IC, and
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ (1−√η) ·OPT
(
D̂
)
− ε−√η.
Theorem 8 (Optimal Mechanism Design under Bayesnet Item Distributions). Consider the general mechanism
design setting of Section 2. Recall that L is the Lipschitz constant of the valuations. Let D̂ =×i∈[n] D̂i, where each
D̂i is a m-dimensional distribution generated by a Bayesnet pi, as in Definition 8, defined on a DAG with Ni ≥ m
nodes, in-degree at most d, and supp(D̂i) ⊆ Σm ⊆ [0, H]m. When Ni > m, we say D̂i is generated by an MRF with
Ni −m latent variables. We use N to denote maxi∈[n]{Ni}.
For every ε, δ > 0, and η ≤ poly(n, m,L, H, ε), we can learn, with probability at least 1− δ, an η-BIC w.r.t. D̂
and IR mechanism M̂, whose revenue under truthful bidding is at most ε smaller than the optimal revenue achievable
by any η-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR mechanism, with
• poly
(
n, d, N, |Σ|d+1,L, H, 1/η, 1/ε, log(1/δ)
)
samples if the alphabet Σ is finite;
• poly
(
n, dd+1, Nd+1, (HCε )
d+1,L, 1/η, log(1/δ)
)
samples if the alphabet Σ = [0, H], and for every pi, the
conditional probability of every node v is C-Lipschitz in the `1-norm (see Theorem 10 for the definition).
If n = 1, the mechanism M̂ will be IR and IC, and
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ (1−√η) ·OPT
(
D̂
)
− ε−√η.
7.2 Sample Complexity for Learning MRFs and Bayesnets
In this section, we present the sample complexity of learning an MRF or a Bayesnet. Our sample complexity
scales gracefully with the maximum size of hyperedges in an MRF and indegree in a Bayesnet. Furthermore,
our results hold even in the presence of latent variables, where we can only observe the values of k variables,
out of the total |V| variables, in a sample.
Theorem 9 (Learnability of MRFs in Total Variation and Prokhorov Distance). Suppose we are given sample
access to an MRF p, as in Definition 7, defined on an unknown graph with hyper-edges of size at most d.
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• Finite alphabet Σ: Given poly(|V|
d ,|Σ|d ,log( 1ε ))
ε2
samples from p we can learn some MRF q whose hyper-edges
also have size at most d such that ‖p− q‖TV ≤ ε. If the graph on which p is defined is known, then
poly(|V|,|E|,|Σ|d ,log( 1ε ))
ε2
-many samples suffice. Moreover, the polynomial dependence of the sample complexity
on |Σ|d cannot be improved, and the dependence on ε is tight up to poly(log 1ε ) factors.
• Alphabet Σ = [0, H]: If the log potentials φv(·) ≡ log (ψv(·)) and φe(·) ≡ log (ψe(·)) for every node v and
every edge e are C-Lipschitz w.r.t. the `1-norm, then given poly
(
|V|d2 ,
(
H
ε
)d
, Cd
)
samples from p we can
learn some MRF q whose hyper-edges also have size at most d such that ‖p− q‖P ≤ ε. If the graph on which
p is defined is known, then poly
(
|V|, |E|d,
(
H
ε
)d
, Cd
)
-many samples suffice.
Our sample complexity bounds can be easily extended to MRFs with latent variables, i.e. to the case where some
subset V′ ⊆ V of the variables are observable in each sample we draw from p. Suppose k = |V′| ≤ |V| is the number
of observable variables. In this case, for all settings discussed above, our sample complexity bound only increases by a
k · log |V| multiplicative factor.
Theorem 10 (Learnability of Bayesnets in Total Variation and Prokhorov Distance). Suppose we are given
sample access to a Bayesnet p, as in Definition 8, defined on an unknown DAG with in-degree at most d.
• Finite alphabet Σ: Given O
(
d|V| log |V|+|V|·|Σ|d+1 log
( |V||Σ|
ε
)
ε2
)
-many samples from p we can learn some
Bayesnet q defined on a DAG whose in-degree is also bounded by d such that ‖p− q‖TV ≤ ε. If the graph
on which p is defined is known, then O
(
|V|·|Σ|d+1 log
( |V||Σ|
ε
)
ε2
)
-many samples suffice. Moreover, the depen-
dence of the sample complexity on |Σ|d+1 and 1ε is tight up to logarithmic factors.
• Alphabet Σ = [0, H]: Suppose that the conditional probability distribution of every node v is C-Lipschitz
in the `1-norm, that is,
∥∥∥pXv |XΠv=σ − pXv |XΠv=σ′∥∥∥TV ≤ C · ‖σ− σ′‖1, ∀v and σ, σ′ ∈ ΣΠv . Then, given
O
(
d|V| log |V|+|V|·
(
H|V|dC
ε
)d+1
log
( |V|HdC
ε
)
ε2
)
-many samples from p, we can learn some Bayesnet q defined on
a DAG whose in-degree is also bounded by d such that ‖p− q‖P ≤ ε. If the graph on which p is defined is
known, then O
(
|V|·
(
H|V|dC
ε
)d+1
log
( |V|HdC
ε
)
ε2
)
-many samples suffice.
Our sample complexity bounds can be easily extended to Bayesnets with latent variables, i.e. to the case where some
subset V′ ⊆ V of the variables are observable in each sample we draw from p. Suppose k = |V′| ≤ |V| is the number
of observable variables. In this case, for all settings discussed above, our sample complexity bound only increases by a
k · log |V| multiplicative factor.
In our proof of Theorem 9, we first carefully construct an ε-net over all MRFs with hyperedges of size
at most d in either total variation distance or Prokhorov distance, then apply a tournament-style density
estimation algorithm [29, 26, 1] to learn a distribution from the ε-net that is at most O(ε) away from the
true distribution using polynomially many samples. Our proof of Theorem 10 follows a similar recipe. The
main difference is how we construct the ε-net over all Bayesnets with in-degree at most d. Both proofs are
presented in Appendix F.
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A Further Related Work
As described earlier, most prior work on learning multi-item auctions follows a PAC-learning approach,
bounding the statistical complexity of classes of mechanisms that are (approximately) optimal for the set-
ting of interest. The statistical complexity measures that are used for this purpose are the standard no-
tions of pseudodimension, which generalizes VC dimension to real valued functions, and Rademacher
complexity. In particular, Morgenstern and Roughgarden [47] and Syrgkanis [55] bound respectively the
pseudodimension and Rademacher complexity of simple classes of mechanisms that have been shown in
the literature to contain approximately optimal mechanisms in multi-item multi-bidder settings satisfy-
ing item-independence [19, 6, 56, 15, 17]. The classes of mechanisms studied by these works contain ap-
proximately optimal mechanisms in multi-item settings with item-independence and either multiple unit-
demand/additive bidders, or a single subadditive bidder. More powerful classes of simple mechanisms
are also known in the literature. The state-of-the-art is the sequential two-part tariff mechanism considered by
Cai and Zhao [17], which is shown to approximate the optimal revenue in multi-item settings even with
multiple bidders whose valuations are fractionally subadditive, again under item-independence. Unfortu-
nately, both the pseudodimension and the empirical Rademacher complexity of sequential two-part tariff
mechanisms are already exponential even in two bidder settings, making these measures unsuitable tools
for showing the learnability of two-part tariff mechanisms.
An important feature of the afore-described works is that bounding the pseudo-dimension or empirical
Rademacher complexity of mechanism classes is oblivious to the structure in the distribution. Hence, while
the mechanisms considered in these works are only approximately optimal under item-independence, the
independence cannot be exploited. In contrast to empirical Rademacher complexity, Rademacher com-
plexity is sensitive to the underlying distribution, but bounds exploiting the structure of the distribution
are not easy to obtain. This observation motivated another line of work which heavily exploits the struc-
ture of the distributions of interest to choose both the class of mechanisms and the statistical complexity
measure to bound their learnability. So far, this approach has only been applied to settings satisfying item-
independence. Indeed, Cai and Daskalakis [11] propose a statistical complexity measure that is tailored to
product distributions, and use their new measure to establish learnability of sequential two-part tariff mech-
anisms under item-independence. Gonczarowski and Weinberg [36] choose a finite class of mechanisms so
that an up-to-ε optimal mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the class. For item-independent distributions,
the size of this class is only singly exponential implying polynomial sample learnability. Unfortunately, the
size becomes doubly exponential for correlated items turning the sample complexity exponential.
Finally, Goldner and Karlin [34] do not use a PAC-learning based approach. They show how to learn
approximately optimal auctions in the multi-item multi-bidder setting with additive bidders using only
one sample from each bidder’s distribution, assuming that it is regular and independent across items. Their
approach is tailored for a mechanism designed by Yao [56] and does not apply to broader settings.
B Additional Preliminaries
Definition 9 (Total Variation Distance). The total variation distance between two probability measures P and Q
on a σ-algebra F of subsets of some sample space Ω, denoted ||P−Q||TV , is defined as
sup
E∈F
|P(E)−Q(E)| .
Definition 10 (Kolmogorov Distance). The Kolmogorov distance between two distributions P and Q over R,
denoted ‖P−Q‖K, is defined as
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣ PrX∼P[X ≤ x]− PrX∼Q[X ≤ x]
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 11 (Le´vy Distance). Let D1 and D2 be two probability distributions on R with cumulative distribution
functions F and G respectively. Then we denote their Le´vy distance by
‖D1 −D2‖L = inf {ε > 0 : F(x− ε)− ε ≤ G(x) ≤ F(x + ε) + ε, ∀x ∈ R}
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Multi-item Auctions: We focus on revenue maximization in the combinatorial auction with n bidders
and m heterogenous items.
The outcomes of the auction lie in X ⊆ {0, 1}n·m such that for any allocation x ∈ X, xi,j is the probability
that bidder i receives item j. Formally, X =
{
(xi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] ∈ {0, 1}nm | ∀j : ∑ni=1 xi,j ≤ 1
}
. Each bidder
i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi(·) : X → R that maps an allocations of items to a real number. In this
paper, we assume the function vi(·) is parametrized by (vi,1, . . . , vi,m), where vi,j is bidder i’s value for item
j. We will refer to the vector (vi,1, . . . , vi,m) as bidder i’s type, and we assume that each bidder’s type is drawn
independently from some distribution. 9 Throughout this paper, we assume all bidders types lie in [0, H]m.
Mechanisms, Payments, and Utility: We use p = (p1, . . . , pn) to specify the payments for the bidders.
Given some prices p = (p1, . . . , pn), allocation x and type vi, denote the quasilinear utility of bidder i ∈ [n]
by ui(vi, (x, p)) = vi(x)− pi. Let M = (x(·), p(·)) be a mechanism with allocation rule x(·) and payment
rule p(·). For any input bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bn), the allocation rule outputs a distribution over allocations
x(b) ∈ ∆(X) and payments p(b) = (p1(b), . . . , pn(b)). Then ui(vi, M(b)) = vi(x(b)) − pi(b). If bidder
i’s type is vi, then her utility under input bid vector b is ui (vi, M(b)) = E [vi (x(b))− pi(b)], where the
expectation is over the randomness of the allocation and payment rule.
ε-Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational:
• Ex-post Individually Rational (IR): M is IR if for all types v ∈ [0, H]n·m and all bidders i ∈ [n],
ui(vi, M(vi, v−i)) ≥ 0.
• ε-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (ε-DSIC): if for all i ∈ [n], v ∈ [0, H]n·m and potential misre-
ports v′i ∈ [0, H]m of bidder i, ui(vi, M(vi, v−i)) ≥ ui(vi, M((v′i, v−i)))− ε. A mechanism is DSIC if it
is 0-DSIC.
• ε-Bayesian Incentive Compatible (ε-BIC): if bidders draw their values from some distribution F =
(F1, . . . ,Fn), then define M to be ε-BIC with respect to F if
Ev−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M(vi, v−i))] ≥ Ev−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M(v′i, v−i))]− ε,
for all potential misreports v′i, in expectation over all other bidders bid v−i. A mechanism is BIC if it
is 0-BIC.
If there is only one bidder, the definition of DSIC coincides with the definition of BIC, and we simply
use ε-IC to describe the incentive compatibility of single bidder mechanisms.
In single-bidder case, there is a well known transformation, Lemma 11, that maps any ε-IC mechanism
to an IC mechanism with negligible revenue loss. To the best of our knowledge, the result is attributed
Nisan in [18, 39, 36] and many other papers.
Lemma 11 (Nisan, circa 2005). Let M be an IR and ε-IC mechanism for a single bidder, and D be the bidder’s
type distribution. Modifying each possible allocation and payment pair by multiplying the payment by 1−√ε and
letting the bidder choose the (modified) allocation and payment pair that maximizes her utility yields an IR and IC
mechanism M′ with expected revenue at least (1−√ε)(REVT(M,D)−
√
ε). Importantly, the modification does not
require any knowledge of D.
Interested readers can find a proof of Lemma 11 in [36].
Up-to-ε Optimal Mechanisms: We say a mechanism M is up-to-ε optimal under distribution D, if
REVT(M,D) ≥ OPT(D)− ε.
9We will not explicitly write bidder i’s valuation as vi,vi (·) where vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,m).
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C Missing Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2: We prove the claim using a hybrid argument. We construct a collection of distributions,
where D(0) = D, D(i) = D̂1 × · · · × D̂i ×Di+1 × · · · × Dn for all 1 ≤ i < n, and D(n) = D̂. We first show
the following claim
Claim 1.
OPT
(
D(i)
)
≥ OPT
(
D(i−1)
)
− 3H · ε,
for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. W.l.o.g, we can assume the optimal mechanism for D(i−1) is a deterministic. We use M = (x, p) to
denote it. In particular, there exists a collection of monotone non-decreasing functions {µj(·)}{j∈[n]} such
that µj : supp
(
D(i−1)j
)
7→ R. We extend the function µj(·) to the whole interval (−∞, H]. We slightly abuse
notation and still call the extended function µj(·). For any z ∈ supp
(
D(i−1)j
)
, µj(x) remains the same. For
any z > inf supp
(
D(i−1)j
)
, let
µj(z) = sup
{
µj(w) | w ≤ z and w ∈ supp
(
D(i−1)j
)}
.
If z ≤ inf supp
(
D(i−1)j
)
and /∈ supp
(
D(i−1)j
)
, let µj(z) = −∞.
Now we define a mechanism M′ = (x′, p′) for D(i) based on the extended {µj(·)}{j∈[n]}. For every
profile v, let the bidder j∗ with the highest positive µj(vj) be the winner. If no bidder j has positive µj(vj),
the item is unallocated. When there are ties, break the tie in alphabetical order. Clearly, the allocation
rule is monotone. According to Myerson’s payment identity, if a bidder wins the item, she should pay
inf{z | z is a winning bid}.
To prove the claim, we demonstrate the following two statements: for every fixed v−i (A1:) bidder i’s
expected payments under D(i) and D(i−1) are within O(H · ε); (A2:) the total expected payments of all
bidders except i under D(i) and D(i−1) are within O(H · ε). We first prove A1.
Proof of A1: For every fixed v−i, let `∗ = argmax` 6=i µ`(v`). For bidder i to win the item, µi(vi) needs to
be greater than µ`∗(v`∗). Therefore, there exists a threshold θ(v−i) for every fixed v−i, such that bidder i
wins the item iff vi ≥ θ(v−i). Clearly,
Evi∼D̂i [p
′
i(vi, v−i)] = θ(v−i) · Pr
vi∼D̂i
[vi ≥ θ(v−i)] ,
and
Evi∼Di [pi(vi, v−i)] = θ(v−i) · Prvi∼Di [vi ≥ θ(v−i)] .
Since
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
K
≤ ε,
∣∣∣Prvi∼D̂i [vi ≥ θ(v−i)]− Prvi∼Di [vi ≥ θ(v−i)]∣∣∣ ≤ ε, which implies that∣∣Ev∼D(i) [p′i(v)]−Ev∼D(i−1) [pi(v)]∣∣
≤ E
v−i∼D(i)−i
[∣∣∣Evi∼D̂i [p′i(vi, v−i)]−Evi∼Di [pi(vi, v−i)]∣∣∣]
≤ E
v−i∼D(i)−i
[θ(v−i) · ε]
≤ H · ε
This completes the argument for statement A1. Next, we prove statement A2.
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Proof of A2: Since there is only one item, only the winner `∗ has non-zero payment and ∑` 6=i p`(v) =
p`∗(v) for any vi. Our goal now is to bound the difference between Evi∼Di [p`∗(v)] and Evi∼D̂i
[
p′`∗(v)
]
.
Note that
Evi∼Di [p`∗(v)] =
∫ H
0
Pr
vi∼Di
[p`∗(v) > t]dt.
When µ`∗(t) ≥ µ`∗(v`∗), Prvi∼Di [p`∗(v) > t] = 0, so we only consider the case where µ`∗(t) < µ`∗(v`∗). Let
α = max` 6=i or `∗ µ`(v`). p`∗(v) > t is equivalent to having max{α, µi(vi)} > µ`∗(t) and µi(vi) < µ`∗(v`∗) if
`∗ > i (or µi(vi) ≤ µ`∗(v`∗) if `∗ < i). Since µi(·) is monotone, it is not hard to observe that this is equivalent
to having vi lying in some interval that only depends on v−i. Let the lower bound of the interval be a(v−i)
and the upper bound be b(v−i). Similarly, we know
Evi∼D̂i [p`∗(v)] =
∫ H
0
Pr
vi∼D̂i
[p′`∗(v) > t]dt,
and Prvi∼D̂i [p
′
`∗(v) > t] is also the probability that vi lies between a(v−i) and b(v−i). Since
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
K
≤ ε,∣∣∣Prvi∼Di [p`∗(v) > t]− Prvi∼D̂i [p′`∗(v) > t]∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε for all t ∈ [0, H], and∣∣∣Evi∼Di [p`∗(v)]−Evi∼D̂i [p′`∗(v)]∣∣∣ ≤ H · 2ε.
Combining statement (i) and (ii), we complete the proof.
By Claim 1, it is clear that
OPT
(
D̂
)
= OPT
(
D(n)
)
≥ OPT
(
D(0)
)
− 3nH · ε = OPT (D)− 3nH · ε
2
Proof of Lemma 6: For every i ∈ [n], we construct two extra distributions D˜i and D˜i as follows. D˜i is
supported on [ε, H + ε], and its CDF is defined as FD˜i (x) = FDi (x− ε). D˜i is supported on [−ε, H − ε], and
its CDF is defined as FDi (x) = FDi (x + ε). In other words, D˜i is the distribution by shifting all values in Di
to the right by ε, and D˜i is the distribution by shifting all values in Di to the left by ε.
Claim 2. Let M be any DSIC and IR mechanism for D˜ =×ni=1 D˜i, there exists a DSIC and IR mechanism M′ for
D˜ =×ni=1 D˜i such that
REV(M′, D˜) ≥ REV(M, D˜)− 2ε.
Proof. Based on the construction of D˜ and D˜, we can couple the two distributions so that whenever we
draw a value profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) from D˜, we also draw a value profile v− 2ε = (v1 − 2ε, . . . , vn − 2ε)
from D˜. Given mechanism M = (x, p), we construct mechanism M′ as follows. For every bid profile v, we
offer bidder i the item with probability xi(v + 2ε) and asks her to pay pi(v + 2ε)− 2ε · xi(v + 2ε). Why is
M′ a DSIC and IR mechanism? For any value profile v and any bidder i, her utility for reporting the true
value is
(vi + 2ε) · xi(v + 2ε)− pi(v + 2ε),
and her utility for misreporting to v′i is
(vi + 2ε) · xi
(
(v′i, v−i) + 2ε
)− pi((v′i, v−i) + 2ε).
Now consider a different scenario, where we run mechanism M and all the other bidders report v−i + 2ε.
The former is bidder i’s utility in M when her true value is vi + 2ε and she reports truthfully. The latter
is bidder i’s utility in M when she lies and reports v′i + 2ε. As M is a DSIC and IR mechanism, (vi +
2ε) · xi(v + 2ε)− pi(v + 2ε) is nonnegative and greater than (vi + 2ε) · xi
(
(v′i, v−i) + 2ε
)− pi((v′i, v−i) + 2ε).
Thus, M′ is also a DSIC and IR mechanism. Since there is only one item for sale, ∑i xi(v + 2ε) ≤ 1. For
every value profile v, the total payment in M′ for this profile is at most 2ε smaller than the total payment in
M for value profile v + 2ε. Therefore, REV(M′, D˜) ≥ REV(M, D˜)− 2ε.
28
An easy corollary of Claim 2 is that
OPT(D˜) ≥ OPT(D˜)− 2ε. (2)
Next we will use this corollary and Theorem 2 to prove our claim. Note that ‖D˜i −Di‖K ≤ ε and
∥∥∥D˜i −Di∥∥∥
K
≤
ε for all i ∈ [n]. Theorem 2 implies that
OPT(D) ≥ OPT(D˜)− 3nH · ε (3)
and
OPT(D˜) ≥ OPT(D)− 3n(H + ε) · ε. (4)
Chaining inequalities (3), (2), and (4), we have
OPT(D) ≥ OPT(D)− (6nH + 3nε+ 2) · ε.
2
D Missing Details from Section 4
D.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3:
We first construct a mechanism M2, and we show that M2 is (2mLHρ+ η)-BIC w.r.t. F̂ and IR. We first
define a mapping τi for every bidder i:
τi(vi) =
{
vi, if vi ∈ supp(Fi)
argmaxz∈supp(Fi)∪⊥ Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(z, b−i))] , otherwise.
(5)
Note that Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(⊥, b−i))] = 0. For any bid profile v, we use τ(v) to denote the vector
(τ1(v1), . . . , τn(vn)). Let x(·) and p(·) be the allocation and payment rule for M1. We now define M2’s
allocation rule x′(·) and payment rule p′(·). For any bid profile v, x′(v) = x(τ(v)). If τi(vi) 6= vi and
τ`(v`) 6=⊥ for all bidders ` ∈ [n], then
p′i(vi, v−i) = vi(x(τ(v))) ·
Eb−i∼F−i [pi(τi(vi), b−i)]
Eb−i∼F−i [vi (x (τi(vi), b−i))]
.
Otherwise, p′i(v) = pi(τ(v)).
An important property of p′(·) is that Eb−i∼F−i
[
p′i(vi, b−i)
]
= Eb−i∼F−i [pi(τi(vi), b−i)] for any vi. We
first argue that M2 is IR.
M2 is IR: For any bidder i and any bid profile v, if any of τ`(v`) =⊥ bidder i’s utility is clearly 0. So we
only need to consider the case where τ`(v`) 6=⊥ for all ` ∈ [n].
• If vi = τi(vi), bidder i’s utility is vi(x(vi, τ−i(v−i))) − pi(vi, τ−i(v−i)) = ui (vi, M1(vi, τ−i(v−i))),
which is non-negative as vi ∈ supp(Fi) and M1 is IR.
• If vi 6= τi(vi), since τi(vi) 6=⊥ by our assumption,
Eb−i∼F−i [vi (x (τi(vi), b−i))]−Eb−i∼F−i [pi(τi(vi), b−i)] = Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(vi), b−i))] ,
which is non-negative due to the definition of τi(·). Equivalently, this means that
Eb−i∼F−i [pi(τi(vi), b−i)]
Eb−i∼F−i [vi (x (τi(vi), b−i))]
≤ 1
and p′i(vi, v−i) ≤ vi(x(τ(v))) = vi(x′(v)).
Next, we argue that M2 is (2mLHρ+ η)-BIC.
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M2 is (2mLHρ + η)-BIC: Consider any bidder i and any type vi and t, we first bound the difference
between Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(t), b−i))] and Ebˆ−i∼F̂−i
[
ui(vi, M2(t, bˆ−i))
]
. Note that
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(t), b−i))] = Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M2(t, b−i))] . (6)
This is because x′(t, b−i) = x(τi(t), b−i) ∀b−i ∈ supp(F−i) andEb−i∼F−i
[
p′i(t, b−i)
]
= Eb−i∼F−i [pi(τi(t), b−i)]
Since
∥∥∥F̂j −Fj∥∥∥
TV
= ε j, we can couple b−i and bˆ−i so that
Pr[b−i 6= bˆ−i] ≤ ρ.
Clearly, when b−i = bˆ−i, ui(vi, M2(t, b−i)) = ui(vi, M2(t, bˆ−i)). When b−i 6= bˆ−i,∣∣∣ui(vi, M2(t, b−i))− ui(vi, M2(t, bˆ−i))∣∣∣ ≤ mLH,
as ui(vi, M2(t, b′−i)) ∈ [0, mLH] for any b′−i. Hence, for any vi and t∣∣∣Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M2(t, b−i))]−Ebˆ−i∼F̂−i [ui(vi, M2(t, bˆ−i))]∣∣∣ ≤ mLHρ. (7)
Combining Inequality (6) and (7), we have the following inequality∣∣∣Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(t), b−i))]−Ebˆ−i∼F̂−i [ui(vi, M2(t, bˆ−i))]∣∣∣ ≤ mLHρ. (8)
Suppose bidder i has type vi, how much more utility can she get by misreporting? Since M2 is IR, she
clearly cannot gain by reporting a type t, whose corresponding τi(t) =⊥. Next, we argue that she cannot
gain much by reporting any other possible types either. If all other bidders report truthfully, bidder i’s
interim utility for reporting her true type
Ebˆ−i∼F̂−i
[
ui(vi, M2(vi, bˆ−i))
]
≥ Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(vi), b−i))]−mLHρ
≥ max
x∈supp(Fi)
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(x, b−i))]−mLHρ− η
≥ max
t:τi(t) 6=⊥
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(t), b−i))]−mLHρ− η
≥ max
t:τi(t) 6=⊥
Ebˆ−i∼F̂−i
[
ui(vi, M2(t, bˆ−i))
]
− 2mLHρ− η
The first inequality is due to Inequality (8). The second inequality is true because (a) if vi = τi(vi), then
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(vi), b−i))] ≥ maxx∈supp(Fi)
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(x, b−i))]− η
as M1 is η-BIC; (b) if vi /∈ supp(Fi), then by the definition of τi(vi),
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(τi(vi), b−i))] ≥ maxx∈supp(Fi)
Eb−i∼F−i [ui(vi, M1(x, b−i))] .
The third inequality is because when τi(t) 6=⊥ it must lie in supp(Fi). The last inequality is again due to
Inequality (8).
Finally, we show that REVT(M2, F̂ ) is not much less than REVT(M1,F ). Let b ∼ F and bˆ ∼ F̂ . There
exists a coupling of b and bˆ so that they are different w.p. less than ρ. When b = bˆ, M1(b) = M2(bˆ). When
b 6= bˆ, the revenue in M1(b) is at most nmLH more than the revenue in M2(bˆ), as both mechanisms are IR.
Therefore,
REVT(M2, F̂ ) ≥ REVT(M1,F )− nmLHρ.
2
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D.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof of Lemma 7: According to Theorem 4, there exists a coupling γ of F and F̂ so that
Pr
(x,y)∼γ
[d(x, y) > ε] ≤ ε.
Now we bound the probability that r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y), when (x, y) is drawn from γ, and ` is drawn from
U[0, δ]k.
Pr`∼U[0,δ]k ,(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y)
]
=Pr`∼U[0,δ]k ,(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y) ∧ d(x, y) > ε
]
+ Pr`∼U[0,δ]k ,(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y) ∧ d(x, y) ≤ ε
]
≤Pr(x,y)∼γ [d(x, y) > ε] + Pr`∼U[0,δ]k
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y) | d(x, y) ≤ ε
]
· Pr
(x,y)∼γ
[d(x, y) ≤ ε]
≤ε+ Pr`∼U[0,δ]k
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y) | d(x, y) ≤ ε
]
Now, we bound the probability that r(`,δ)(·) rounds two points x and y to two different points when x
and y are within distance ε. For any fixed x and y, we have the following.
Pr`∼U[0,δ]k
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y)
]
≤ ∑
i∈[k]
Pr`i∼U[0,δ]
[
r(`,δ)i (x) 6= r(`,δ)i (y)
]
≤ ∑
i∈[k]
|xi − yi|
δ
=
d(x, y)
δ
The first inequality follows from the union bound. Why is the second inequality true? If |xi − yi| ≥ δ,
the inequality clearly holds, so we only need to consider the case where |xi − yi| < δ. W.l.o.g. we assume
yi ≥ xi and we consider the following two cases: (i)
⌊ yi
δ
⌋
=
⌊ xi
δ
⌋
and (ii)
⌊ yi
δ
⌋
=
⌊ xi
δ
⌋
+ 1. In case (i),
r(`,δ)i (x) 6= r(`,δ)i (y) if and only if ` ∈
[
xi −
⌊ xi
δ
⌋ · δ, yi − ⌊ yiδ ⌋ · δ]. Since ` is drawn from the uniform distri-
bution over [0, δ], this happens with probability exactly yi−xiδ . In case (ii), r
(`,δ)
i (x) 6= r(`,δ)i (y) if and only if
` ∈ [xi − ⌊ xiδ ⌋ · δ, δ] ∪ [0, yi − ⌊ yiδ ⌋ · δ]. This again happens with probability yi−xiδ . Therefore,
Pr`∼U[0,δ]k
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y) | d(x, y) ≤ ε
]
≤ ε
δ
and
Pr`∼U[0,δ]k ,(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y)
]
≤
(
1+
1
δ
)
ε. (9)
Clearly, for any choice of `,
∥∥∥∥bFc`,δ − ⌊F̂⌋`,δ
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ Pr(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y)
]
. Combining this
inequality with Inequality (9), we have
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E`∼U[0,δ]k
[∥∥∥∥bFc`,δ − ⌊F̂⌋`,δ
∥∥∥∥
TV
]
≤E`∼U[0,δ]k
[
Pr
(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y)
]]
=Pr`∼U[0,δ]k ,(x,y)∼γ
[
r(`,δ)(x) 6= r(`,δ)(y)
]
≤
(
1+
1
δ
)
ε
2
D.3 Missing Proofs from Section 4.3
Proof of Lemma 8: We first define M(`)1 . If the bid profile w /∈ supp(D), the mechanism allocates nothing
and charges no one. If the bid profile w ∈ supp(D), for each bidder i sample w′i independently from the
distribution Di |×mj=1 β(wij), where β(wij) is defined to be [0, `j) if wij = 0 and [wij, wij + δ) otherwise.
Bidder i receives allocation xM,i(w′) and pays (pM,i(w′)− mLδ)+ = max{0, pM,i(w′)− mLδ}. Note that,
for any i ∈ [n], if wi is drawn from bDic`,δ then w′i is drawn from Di. If all bidders bid truthfully in M(`)1 ,
the revenue is at least REV(M,D)− nmLδ. Next, we argue that M(`)1 is IR and ξ1-BIC with ξ1 = O(mLδ).
Note that for every bidder i and wi ∈ supp(bDic`,δ) her interim utility in M(`)1 when all other bidders
bid truthfully is at least Ew′i∼Di |×mj=1 β(wij),w′−i∼D−i
[
ui(wi, M(w′i , w
′
−i))
]
due to the definition of M(`)1 . Now
consider every realization of w′i , it must hold that
Ew′−i∼D−i
[
ui(wi, M(w′i , w
′
−i))
]
≥Ew′−i∼D−i
[
ui(w′i , M(w
′
i , w
′
−i))
]−mLδ
≥ max
x∈supp(Di)
Ew′−i∼D−i
[
ui(w′i , M(x, w
′
−i))
]−mLδ
≥ max
x∈supp(Di)
Ew′−i∼D−i
[
ui(wi, M(x, w′−i))
]− 2mLδ
The first and the last inequalities are both due to the fact that the valuation is L-Lipschitz and ∥∥wi − w′i∥∥1 ≤
mδ. The second inequality is because M is BIC w.r.t. D. Hence, bidder i’s interim utility in M(`)1 is at least
maxx∈supp(Di)Ew′−i∼D−i
[
ui(wi, M(x, w′−i))
]− 2mLδ.
If bidder i misreports, her utility is no more than
max
x∈supp(Di)
Ew′−i∼D−i
[
ui(wi, M(x, w′−i))
]
+ mLδ,
due to the definition of M(`)1 . Therefore, misreporting can increase bidder i’s utility by at most 3mLδ, and
M(`)1 is 3mLδ-BIC.
Next, we argue that M(`)1 is IR. If the w−i /∈ supp(D−i), bidder i’s utility is 0. So we focus on the
case where w−i ∈ supp(D−i). We will show that for any realization of w′i and w′−i, bidder i’s utility is
non-negative. If the payment is 0, the claim is trivially true. If the payment is nonzero, bidder i pays
pM,i(w′)− mLδ and has utility ui(wi, M(w′i , w′−i))) + mLδ which is at least ui(w′i , M(w′i , w′−i))), since the
valuation is L-Lipschitz and ∥∥wi − w′i∥∥1 ≤ mδ. As M is IR, ui(w′i , M(w′i , w′−i))) ≥ 0. Thus, bidder i’s utility
is non-negative and M(`)1 is IR.2
Proof of Lemma 9: We first construct M̂(`). For any bid profile w, construct w′ = (r(`,δ)(w1), . . . , r(`,δ)(wn)),
and run M(`)2 on w
′. Bidder i receives allocation x
M(`)2 ,i
(w′) and pays max{0, p
M(`)2 ,i
(w′)−mLδ}. Note that
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if wi ∼ D̂i, then w′i ∼
⌊
D̂i
⌋
`,δ
. Assuming all other bidders bid truthfully and bidder i’s type is wi, bidder i’s
interim utility for bidding truthfully is
Eb−i∼D̂−i
[
ui(wi, M̂(`)(wi, b−i))
]
≥ Eb′−i∼D̂−i
[
ui(wi, M
(`)
2 (w
′
i , b
′
−i))
]
≥ Eb−i∼D̂−i
[
ui(w′i , M
(`)
2 (w
′
i , b
′
−i))
]
−mLδ
≥ max
x∈supp(bD̂ic`,δ)
Eb′−i∼D̂−i
[
ui(w′i , M
(`)
2 (x, b
′
−i))
]
− ξ2 −mLδ
≥ max
x∈supp(bD̂ic`,δ)
Eb′−i∼D̂−i
[
ui(wi, M
(`)
2 (x, b
′
−i))
]
− ξ2 − 2mLδ
≥ max
y∈supp(D̂i)
Eb−i∼D̂−i
[
ui(wi, M̂(`)(y, b−i))
]
− ξ2 − 3mLδ
The first inequality and the last equality are due to the definition of M̂(`). The second and the fourth
inequalities are due to the L-Lipschitzness of the valuation function and ∥∥wi − w′i∥∥1 ≤ mδ. The third
inequality is because M(`)2 is a ξ2-BIC mechanism w.r.t. D̂. By this chain of inequalities, we know that M̂(`)
is a (ξ2 + 3mLδ)-BIC mechanism w.r.t. D̂.
Next, we argue that M̂(`) is also IR. Consider any bidder i and type profile w, M̂(`)(w) has the same
allocation as M(`)2 (w
′). When bidder i’s payment is 0, her utility is clearly non-negative. When bidder
i’s payment is p
M(`)2 ,i
(w′) − mLδ, her utility is at least ui(w′i , M(`)2 (w′)) due to the L-Lipschitzness of the
valuation function and
∥∥wi − w′i∥∥1 ≤ mδ. Since M(`)2 is IR, bidder i’s utility in M̂(`) is also non-negative.
Finally, if all bidders bid truthfully in M̂(`) when their types are drawn from D̂, its revenue under
truthful bidding is
REVT
(
M̂(`), D̂
)
≥ REVT
(
M(`)2 , D̂
)
− nmLδ.
2
Proof of Theorem 5: First, sample ` uniformly from [0, δ]m, and construct bDic`,δ for all i ∈ [n]. According to
Lemma 8, we can construct a mechanism M(`)1 based on M that is ξ1 = O(mLδ)-BIC w.r.t.×ni=1 bDic`,δ, IR,
and has revenue REVT
(
M(`)1 ,×ni=1 bDic`,δ) ≥ REV(M,D)− nmLδ.
Next, we transform M(`)1 to M
(`)
2 using Lemma 3. We use ε
(`)
i to denote
∥∥∥∥bDic`,δ − ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ
∥∥∥∥
TV
for
our sample ` and every i ∈ [n], and ρ(`) to denote ∑i∈[n] ε(`)i . For every realization of `, M(`)2 is ξ2 =(
2mLHρ(`) + ξ1
)
-BIC w.r.t.×ni=1 ⌊D̂i⌋`,δ and IR. Its revenue under truthful bidding satisfies
REVT
(
M(`)2 ,
n×
i=1
⌊
D̂i
⌋
`,δ
)
≥ REVT
(
M(`)1 ,
n×
i=1
bDic`,δ
)
− nmLHρ(`).
Lemma 9 shows that we can construct M̂(`) using M(`)2 , such that M̂
(`) is a (ξ2 + 3mLδ)-BIC w.r.t. D̂
and IR mechanism with revenue
REVT
(
M̂(`), D̂
)
≥ REVT
(
M(`)2 ,
n×
i=1
⌊
D̂i
⌋
`,δ
)
− nmLδ.
Since M̂(`) is O(mLδ + mLHρ(`))-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR for every realization of `, our mechanism M̂
is clearly O
(
mLδ+ mLH ·E`∼U[0,δ]m
[
ρ(`)
])
-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Moreover, its expected revenue under
truthful bidding satisfies
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REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ REV (M,D)−O
(
nmLδ+ nmLH ·E`∼U[0,δ]m
[
ρ(`)
])
.
According to Lemma 7,
E`∼U[0,δ]m
[
ρ(`)
]
≤ n
(
1+
1
δ
)
ε.
We choose δ to be
√
nHε, and M̂ becomes κ-BIC w.r.t. D̂, where κ = O
(
nmLHε+ mL√nHε
)
, and IR.
Furthermore,
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ REV (M,D)−O (nκ) .
2
D.4 Lipschitz Continuity of the Optimal Revenue in Multi-item Auctions
Using Theorem 5, we can easily prove that the optimal BIC revenue w.r.t. D and the optimal BIC revenue
w.r.t. D̂ are close as long as Di and D̂i are close in either the total variation distance or the Prokhorov
distance for all i ∈ [n].
Theorem 11 (Lipschitz Continuity of the Optimal Revenue). Consider the general mechanism design setting
of Section 2. Recall that L is the Lipschitz constant of the valuations. For any distributions D =×ni=1Di and
D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i, where Di and D̂i are supported on [0, H]m for every i ∈ [n]
• If
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
TV
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], then∣∣∣OPT(D)−OPT(D̂)∣∣∣ ≤ O (nmLH (nε+√nε)) ;
• if
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], then∣∣∣OPT(D)−OPT(D̂)∣∣∣ ≤ O (nκ + n√mLHκ) ,
where κ = O
(
nmLHε+ mL√nHε
)
.
Proof of Theorem 11: Let M∗ be the optimal BIC mechanism for D. We first prove the Prokorov case. Accord-
ing to Theorem 5, there exists a mechanism M̂∗ such that it is κ-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Moreover,
REVT(M̂∗, D̂) ≥ REV(M∗,D)−O(nκ).
By Lemma 1, REVT
(
M̂∗, D̂
)
≤ OPT
(
D̂
)
+ 2n
√
mLHκ. Combining the two inequalities, we have
OPT
(
D̂
)
≥ OPT(D)−O
(
nκ + n
√
mLHκ
)
.
By symmetry, we can also argue that
OPT(D) ≥ OPT
(
D̂
)
−O
(
nκ + n
√
mLHκ
)
.
In the TV case, REVT
(
M̂∗, D̂
)
≥ REV(M∗,D)−O(n2mLHε). Since M̂∗ is O(mnLHε)-BIC, OPT
(
D̂
)
≥
REVT
(
M̂∗, D̂
)
− O(nmLH√nε) due to Lemma 1. By symmetry and the inequalities above, we have∣∣∣OPT(D)−OPT (D̂)∣∣∣ ≤ O (nmLH(nε+√nε)). 2
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D.5 Approximation Preserving Transformation
Theorem 12 (Approximation Preserving Transformation). Consider the general mechanism design setting of
Section 2. Recall thatL is the Lipschitz constant of the valuations. GivenD =×ni=1Di, whereDi is a m-dimensional
distribution supported on [0, H]m for all i ∈ [n], and a BIC w.r.t. D and IR mechanism M. We use D̂ =×ni=1 D̂i to
denote the true but unknown type distribution, and D̂i is supported on [0, H]m for all i ∈ [n].
If
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
TV
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], we can construct a mechanism M̂, in a way that is completely oblivious to the
true distribution D̂, such that
1. M̂ is η-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR, where η = O(nmLHε);
2. if M is a c-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue for D, then
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
−O (nmLH (nε+√nε)) .
If
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ ε for all i ∈ [n], we can again construct a mechanism M̂, in a way that is completely oblivious to
the true distribution D̂, such that
1. M̂ is κ-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR, where κ = O
(
nmLHε+ mL√nHε
)
;
2. if M is a c-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue for D, then M̂ is almost a c-approximation to the optimal
κ-BIC revenue for D̂, that is,
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTκ
(
D̂
)
−O
(
nκ + n
√
mLHκ
)
.
Proof of Theorem 12: For the TV case, by Theorem 3, we can construct a η-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR mechanism
M̂ such that REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ REV(M,D) −O (n2mLHε) ≥ c ·OPT(D) −O (n2mLHε). By Theorem 11,
OPT(D) is at least OPT(D̂) −O (nmLH(nε+√nε)). Finally, OPT(D̂) ≥ OPTη(D̂) − 2n√mLHη due to
Lemma 1, so
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
−O (nmLH(nε+√nε)) .
For the Prokhorov case, according to Theorem 5, we can construct a κ-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR mechanism
M̂ such that REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ REV(M,D)−O (nκ) ≥ c ·OPT(D)−O (nκ). By Theorem 11 and Lemma 1,
OPT(D) ≥ OPT
(
D̂
)
−O
(
nκ + n
√
mLHκ
)
≥ OPTκ(D̂)−O
(
nκ + n
√
mLHκ
)
Chaining all the inequali-
ties above, we have
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTκ(D̂)−O
(
nκ + n
√
mLHκ
)
.
2
If there is a single bidder, we can strengthen Theorem 12 and make constructed mechanism M̂ exactly
IC with essentially the same guarantees.
Theorem 13 (Single-Bidder Approximation Preserving Transformation). Consider the general mechanism de-
sign setting of Section 2. Recall that L is the Lipschitz constant of the valuations. Given a m-dimensional distribution
D supported on [0, H]m, and a IC and IR mechanism M. We use D̂ to denote the true but unknown type distribution,
and D̂ is also supported on [0, H]m.
• If
∥∥∥D − D̂∥∥∥
TV
≤ ε, we can construct an IC and IR mechanism M̂, in a way that is completely oblivious to the
true distribution D̂, such that if M is a c-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue for D, then
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·
(
1−O
(√
mLHε
))
·OPT
(
D̂
)
−O
((
mLH +
√
mLH
)
· √ε
)
.
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• If
∥∥∥D − D̂∥∥∥
P
≤ ε, we can again construct an IC and IR mechanism M̂, in a way that is completely oblivious
to the true distribution D̂, such that if M is a c-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue for D,
REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c · (1−√κ) ·OPT(D̂)−O (κ + (√mLH + 1) · √κ) ,
where κ = O
(
mLHε+ mL√Hε
)
.
Proof of Theorem 13: We only sketch the proof here. Let M′ be the mechanism constructed using Theo-
rem 12, and we construct another mechanism M̂ by modifying M′ using Lemma 11. Clearly, M̂ is IC and
IR. It is not hard to verify that REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
satisfies the guarantees in the statement by combining the rev-
enue guarantees for REVT
(
M′, D̂
)
as provided by Theorem 12 and the relation between REV
(
M̂, D̂
)
and
REVT
(
M′, D̂
)
as stated in Lemma 11. 2
E Missing Proofs from Section 5
We first show that for any product distribution F , we can learn the rounded distribution of F within small
TV distance with polynomially many samples.
Lemma 12. Let F =×mj=1 Fj, where Fj is an arbitrary distribution supported on [0, H] for every j ∈ [m]. Given
N = O
(
m3 H
η3
· (log 1/δ+ log m)
)
samples, we can learn a product distribution F̂ =×mj=1 F̂j such that∥∥∥F − F̂∥∥∥
P
≤ η
with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. We denote the samples as s1, . . . , sN . Round each sample to multiples of η′ = η/m. More specif-
ically, let sˆi =
(⌊
si1/η
′⌋ · η′, . . . , ⌊sim/η′⌋ · η′) for every sample i ∈ [N]. Let F̂j be the uniform distribu-
tion over sˆ1j , . . . , sˆ
N
j . Let F j =
⌊Fj⌋0,η′ . Note that F̂j is the empirical distribution of N samples from
F j. As
∣∣supp(F j)∣∣ = ⌊ Hη′ ⌋ = mHη , with N = O( |supp(F j)|η′2 · (log 1/δ+ log m)) samples, the empirical
distribution F̂j should satisfy
∥∥∥F̂j −F j∥∥∥
TV
≤ η′ with probability at least 1− δ/m. By the union bound∥∥∥F̂j −F j∥∥∥
TV
≤ η′ for all j ∈ [m] with probability at least 1− δ, which implies
∥∥∥F̂ − F∥∥∥
TV
≤ η with prob-
ability at least 1− δ. Observe that F and F can be coupled so that the two samples are always within η
in `1 distance. When
∥∥∥F̂ − F∥∥∥
TV
≤ η, consider the coupling between F̂ and F by composing the optimal
coupling between F̂ and F and the coupling between F and F . Clearly, the two samples from F̂ and F
are within `1 distance η with probability at least 1− η. Due to Theorem 4, the existence of this coupling
implies that
∥∥∥F̂ − F∥∥∥
P
≤ η.
Proof of Theorem 6: We only consider the case, where η ≤ α ·min
{
ε
n ,
ε2
n2mLH
}
. α is an absolute constant and
we will specify its choice in the end of the proof.
In light of Lemma 12, we take N = O
(
m3 H
σ3
· (log nδ + log m)
)
from D̂ and learn a distribution D so that,
with probability at least 1− δ,
∥∥∥Di − D̂i∥∥∥
P
≤ σ for all i ∈ [n]. According to Theorem 12, we can transform
M into mechanism M̂ that is O
(
nmLHσ+ mL√nHσ
)
-BIC w.r.t. D̂ and IR. Choose σ in a way so that M̂ is
η-BIC w.r.t. D̂. Moreover, M̂’s revenue under truthful bidding satisfies
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
−O
(
nη + n
√
mLHη
)
.
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If we choose α to be sufficiently small, then
REVT
(
M̂, D̂
)
≥ c ·OPTη
(
D̂
)
− ε.
When there is only a single-bidder, we can apply Lemma 11 to transform M̂ to an IC and IR mechanism,
whose revenue satisfies the guarantee in the statement.
2
F Missing Proofs from Section 7
F.1 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9: For the purposes of this proof we take n = |V|. We first prove the finite alphabet case,
we then extend the result to the infinite alphabet case, and finally we discuss how to accommodate latent
variables.
Finite alphabet Σ: We will prove our first sample complexity bound by constructing an ε-cover, in total
variation distance, of the set P of all MRFs with hyperedges of size at most d. We can assume that all p ∈ P
satisfy the following:
(A1) : p is defined on the hypergraph G = (V, E), whose edge set is E = (Vd), and all its node potential
functions are constant and equal 1.
The reason we can assume (A1) for all p ∈ P is that potentials of nodes and smaller-size hyperedges can
always be incorporated into the potentials of some size-d hyperedge that contains them, and the potentials
of size-d hyperedges that are not present can always be taken to be constant 1 functions.
Moreover, we can assume the following property for all MRFs p ∈ P :
(A2): maxσ∈Σe ψe(σ) = 1, ∀e ∈ E.
The reason we can assume (A2) for all p ∈ P is that the density of an MRF is invariant to multiplying any
single potential function by some scalar.
Now, given some MRF p ∈ P , satisfying (A1) and (A2), which we can assume without loss of generality,
we will make a sequence of transformations to arrive at some MRF p′′ ∈ P such that ‖p− p′′‖TV ≤ ε and p′′
can be described using B = poly
(
|E|, |Σ|d, log( 1ε )
)
bits. This, in turn, will imply that there exists an ε-cover
P ′ ⊂ P that has size 2B, and the existence of an ε-cover of this size implies that O(B/ε2)-many samples
from any p ∈ P suffice to learn some q ∈ P such that ‖p− q‖TV ≤ O(ε), using a tournament-style density
estimation algorithm; see e.g. [29, 26, 1] and their references.
Here are the steps to transform an arbitrary p ∈ P into some p′′ ∈ P of low bit complexity:
• (Notation:) From now on we will use pˆ to denote unnormalized densities. I.e. if p is defined in terms
of potential functions (ψpe (·))e∈E, then pˆ(x) = ∏e∈E ψpe (xe), ∀x ∈ ΣV .
• (Step 1:) Given some arbitrary p ∈ P , we construct some p′ ∈ P such that ‖p− p′‖TV ≤ ε, p′
satisfies (A1) and (A2) and, moreover, the unnormalized density of p′ satisfies that, for all x ∈ ΣV ,
pˆ′(x) =
(
1+ ε
2nd
)ix
, for some integer ix. The existence of such p′ follows from the invariance of MRFs
with respect to multiplying their potential functions by scalars, and the following.
Claim 3. Suppose p, p′ ∈ P satisfy (A1) and are defined in terms of potential functions (ψpe )e and (ψp
′
e )e
respectively. Moreover, suppose that ∀e, σ ∈ Σe :
ψ
p′
e (σ) ≤ ψpe (σ) ≤
(
1+
ε
2nd
)
ψ
p′
e (σ).
Then ‖p− p′‖TV ≤ ε.
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Proof of Claim 3: It follows from the condition in the statement of the claim that, for all x ∈ ΣV :
pˆ′(x) ≤ pˆ(x) ≤
(
1+
ε
2nd
)(nd) pˆ′(x) ≤ eε/2 pˆ′(x) ≤ (1+ ε) pˆ′(x).
Using the above, let us compare the normalized densities. For all x ∈ ΣV :
p(x) =
pˆ(x)
∑y pˆ(y)
≤ pˆ
′(x)(1+ ε)
∑y pˆ′(y)
≤ p′(x)(1+ ε).
Moreover,
p(x) =
pˆ(x)
∑y pˆ(y)
≥ pˆ
′(x)
∑y pˆ′(y)(1+ ε)
≥ p′(x)/(1+ ε).
Using the above, let us bound the total variation distance between p and p′:∥∥p− p′∥∥TV = 12∑x |p(x)− p′(x)|
=
1
2 ∑x:p(x)≥p′(x)
(p(x)− p′(x)) + 1
2 ∑x:p(x)<p′(x)
(p′(x)− p(x))
≤ 1
2 ∑x:p(x)≥p′(x)
εp′(x) + 1
2 ∑x:p(x)<p′(x)
εp(x) ≤ ε.
2
• (New Notation:) We introduce some further notation. Let
(
ψ
p′
e
)
e
be the potential functions defining
distribution p′ ∈ P from Step 1. We reparametrize these potential functions as follows:
∀e, x ∈ Σe : ξp′e (x) ≡ log
(
ψ
p′
e (x)
)
/ log
(
1+
ε
2nd
)
.
Given the definition of p′ in Step 1, our new potential functions satisfy the following linear equations:
∀x ∈ ΣV : ∑
e∈E
ξ
p′
e (xe) = ix, (10)
where, because of Assumption (A2), satisfied by p′, the integers ix ≤ 0, for all x.
• (Step 2:) We define p′′ by setting up a linear program with variables ξp′′e (xe), ∀e, xe ∈ ΣE. In particular,
the number of variables of the linear program we are about to write is L = |E| · |Σ|d. To define our
linear program, we first define x∗ = argmaxx ix, and partition ΣV into two sets ΣV = G unionsqB, by taking
G = {x | ix ≥ ix∗ − T}, and B the complement of G, for T = 4ndε (n log |Σ|+ log( 1ε )). In particular, all
configurations in B have probability p′(x) ≤ ε/|Σ|n. Our goal is to exhibit that there exists p′′ ∈ P
that (i) satisfies properties (A1) and (A2); (ii) can be described with poly
(
|E|, |Σ|d, log( 1ε )
)
bits; and
(iii) satisfies∑x∈B p′′(x) ≤ ε and p′′(x) = p′(x) · (1+ δ) ∀x ∈ G, where δ ∈
[−ε, ε1−ε ]. We note that (iii)
implies that ‖p′ − p′′‖TV ≤ ε, as either p′′(x) ≥ p′(x) for all x ∈ G simultaneously or p′′(x) < p′(x)
for all x ∈ G simultaneously, and the total mass in B under both p′ and p′′ are at most ε. Combining
(iii) and Claim 3, we have (iv) ‖p− p′′‖TV ≤ 2ε. To exhibit the existence of p′′ we write the following
linear program:
∀x ∈ G \ {x∗} : ∑
e∈E
ξ
p′′
e (xe)− ∑
e∈E
ξ
p′′
e (x∗e ) = ix − ix∗ (11)
∀x ∈ B : ∑
e∈E
ξ
p′′
e (xe)− ∑
e∈E
ξ
p′′
e (x∗e ) ≤ −T
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Note that, because LP (10) is feasible, it follows that LP (11) is feasible as well. Moreover, the coef-
ficients and constants of LP (11) have absolute value less than T and bit complexity polynomial in d,
log n, log( 1ε ) and log log |Σ|, and the number of variables of this LP is L = |E| · |Σ|d. From the theory
of linear programming it follows that there exists a solution to LP (11) of bit complexity polynomial
in |E|, |Σ|d, log n, and log( 1ε ). Why is (iii) true? It is not hard to see that for any x ∈ B, p′′(x) ≤ ε/|Σ|n
due to the second type of constraints in LP (11). For any x ∈ G \ {x∗}, p′′(x)p′′(x∗) =
p′(x)
p′(x∗) due to the
first type of constraints in LP (11), so p′′(x) = p′(x) · (1 + δ) ∀x ∈ G for some constant δ. Since both
∑x∈G p′(x) and ∑x∈G p′′(x) lie in [1− ε, 1], δ lies in
[−ε, ε1−ε ].
To summarize the above (setting ε ← ε/2 in the above derivation), given an arbitrary p ∈ P we can
construct p′′ ∈ P such that: p′′ can be described using B = poly
(
|E|, |Σ|d, log( 1ε )
)
bits—by specifying the
low complexity solution
(
ξ
p′′
e
)
e
to LP (11), and p′′ satisfies ‖p− p′′‖TV ≤ ε. As we have noted above, the
existence of such p′′ for every p ∈ P implies the existence of an ε-cover, in total variation distance, of P that
has size 2B, and tournament-style arguments imply then that any p ∈ P can be learned to within O(ε) in
total variation distance from O( B
ε2
)-many samples, i.e. from
poly(|E|,|Σ|d ,log( 1ε ))
ε2
-many samples.
We now prove the second part of the statement. If the hypergraph (V, Ep) with respect to which p is
defined is known, we redo the above argument, except we take P to be all MRFs defined on the graph
G = (V, E), where E is the union of Ep and all singleton sets corresponding to the nodes V.
For the third part of the statement, we note that an arbitrary distribution p on d variables, each taking
values in Σ, can be expressed as a MRF with maximum hyperedge-size d. As such, it is folklore (see e.g. [29])
that Ω(|Σ|d/ε2) samples are necessary to learn p to within ε in total variation distance. This completes the
proof for the finite alphabet case.
Next, we show how to extend our sample complexity to the case where the alphabet Σ = [0, H].
Alphabet Σ = [0, H]: Let δ = ε
8dC(n+1)d , and Σδ be the set of all multiples of δ between 0 and H.
10 We
first define distribution p˜ to be the rounded version of p using the following coupling. For any sample x
drawn from p, create a sample x˜ drawn from p˜ such that x˜v =
⌊ xv
δ
⌋ · δ for every v ∈ V. Note that (i) this
coupling makes sure that the two samples from p and p˜ are always within ε of each other in `1-distance.
Our plan is to show that we can (ii) learn an MRF q with polynomially many samples from distribution p˜
such that ‖q− p˜‖TV = O(ε). Why does this imply our statement? First, we can generate a sample from p˜
using a sample from p due to the coupling between the two distributions. Second, ‖q− p˜‖TV = O(ε) means
that we can couple q and p˜ in a way that the two samples are the same with probability at least 1−O(ε).
Composing this coupling with the coupling between p˜ and p, we have a coupling between p and q so that
the two samples are within ε of each other in `1-distance with probability at least 1−O(ε). According to
Theorem 4, ‖p− q‖P = O(ε). Now, we focus on proving (ii).
We separate the proof into two steps. In the first step, we show that for any p˜, there is a discretized
MRF q′ supported on ΣVδ with hyperedges of size at most d such that ‖ p˜− q′‖TV ≤ ε and q′ can be de-
scribed with B = poly
(
|E|, |Σδ|d, log( 1ε )
)
bits. In other words, there is a 2B-sized ε-cover over all possible
distributions p˜. In the second step, we show how to learn an MRF q with O(B/ε2) samples from p˜ using a
tournament-style density estimation algorithm; see e.g. [29, 26, 1] and their references. Before we present
the two steps of our proof, and in order to simplify our notation and avoid carrying around node poten-
tials, let us introduce into the edge set E of our hypergraph a singleton edge for every node v, and take the
potential of every such edge e = {v} to equal the node potential of node v.
• (Step 1:) We first define a discrete MRF p′ on the same graph G = (V, E) as p with alphabet Σδ.
Distribution p′ is defined by choosing its log-potential φp
′
e (xe) to be exactly φ
p
e (xe) for every hyperedge
e ∈ E and every possible value xe ∈ Σeδ. Next, we show that (iii) ‖p′ − p˜‖TV ≤ ε/2.
10We further assume that H is a multiple of δ. If not, let k be the integer such that δ ∈
[
H
2k
, H
2k−1
]
, and change δ to be H
2k
.
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We use Ax to denote the n-dimensional cube×v∈V [xv, xv + δ) for any x ∈ ΣVδ . Note that
p˜(x) =
∫
Ax
exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (ye)
)
dy∫
[0,H]n exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (ye)
)
dy
≤
δn exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (xe)
)
· exp(d|E|Cδ)
δn ∑y∈ΣVδ exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (ye)
)
· exp(−d|E|Cδ)
≤ p′(x)(1+ ε/2).
The first inequality is due the C-Lipschitzness of the log potential functions and the second inequality
is due to the definition of δ. Similarly,
p˜(x) =
∫
Ax
exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (ye)
)
dy∫
[0,H]n exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (ye)
)
dy
≥
δn exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (xe)
)
· exp(−d|E|Cδ)
δn ∑y∈ΣVδ exp
(
∑e φ
p
e (ye)
)
· exp(d|E|Cδ)
≥ p
′(x)
1+ ε/2
.
We complete the proof of (iii) by combining the two inequalities.
∥∥ p˜− p′∥∥TV = 12 ∑
x∈ΣVδ
| p˜(x)− p′(x)|
=
1
2 ∑x: p˜(x)≥p′(x)
( p˜(x)− p′(x)) + 1
2 ∑x: p˜(x)<p′(x)
(p′(x)− p˜(x))
≤ 1
2 ∑x: p˜(x)≥p′(x)
ε
2
p′(x) + 1
2 ∑x: p˜(x)<p′(x)
ε
2
p˜(x) ≤ ε/2.
Let P be the set of all MRFs with hyperedges of size at most d and alphabet Σδ. By redoing Step 1 and
2 of the proof for the finite alphabet case, we can show that (iv) for any pˆ ∈ P , there exists another
pˆ′ ∈ P describable with B = poly
(
|E|, |Σδ|d, log( 1ε )
)
bits such that ‖ pˆ− pˆ′‖TV ≤ ε/2. Since p′ ∈ P ,
there exists a q′ ∈ P describable with B bits such that ‖p′ − q′‖TV ≤ ε/2. Combining this inequality
with (iii), we have ‖ p˜− q′‖TV ≤ ε.
• (Step 2:) Let P ′ ⊂ P be the set of all MRFs in P with bit complexity at most B from Step 1. Since
minq˜∈P ′ ‖q˜− p˜‖TV ≤ ε, we can learn an MRF q ∈ P ′ such that ‖q− p˜‖TV ≤ O(ε) with O(B/ε2)
samples from p˜ using a tournament-style density estimation algorithm [29, 26, 1].
To sum up, we can learn an MRF q such that ‖q− p‖P ≤ ε with poly
(
|V|d2 ,
(
H
ε
)d
, Cd
)
many samples
from p. If the graph G on which p is defined is known, we can choose δ to be O
(
ε
8dC|E|
)
and improve the
sample complexity to poly
(
|V|, |E|d,
(
H
ε
)d
, Cd
)
.
Latent Variable Models: Finally, we consider the case where only k out of the n variables of the MRF
are observable. Let S be the set of observable variables, and use pS to denote the marginal of p on these
variables. We will first consider the finite alphabet case. Consider the ε-cover we constructed earlier. We
argued that for any MRF p there exists an MRF q in the cover such that ‖p− q‖TV ≤ ε. For that q we clearly
also have ‖pS − qS‖TV ≤ ε. The issue is that we do not know for a given q in the cover which subset of its
variables set S might correspond to. But this is not a big deal. We can use our cover to generate an ε-cover
of all possible marginals pS of all possible MRFs p as follows. Indeed, for any q′ in the original ε-cover, we
include in the new cover the marginal distribution q′S′ of every possible subset S
′ of its variables of size k.
This increases the size of our original cover by a multiplicative factor of at most nk. As a result, the number
of samples required for the tournament-style density estimation algorithm to learn a good distribution
increases by a multiplicative factor of k log n. For the infinite alphabet case, our statement follows from
applying the same modification to the ε-cover of p˜. 2
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F.2 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof of Theorem 10: We first prove the theorem statement for the finite alphabet case, we then extend it to
the infinite alphabet case, and finally show how we can accommodate latent variables as well.
Finite alphabet Σ: We prove the claims in the theorem statement in reverse order.
For the third part of the statement, we note that an arbitrary distribution p on d + 1 variables, each
taking values in Σ, can be expressed as a Bayesnet with maximum indegree d. As such, it is folklore (see
e.g. [29]) that Ω(|Σ|d+1/ε2) samples are necessary to learn p to within ε in total variation distance.
To prove the second part of the statement, we show that there is an ε-cover, in total variation distance, of
all Bayesnets P on a given DAG G of indegree at most d, which has size B =
(
n|Σ|
ε
)n|Σ|d+1
, where n = |V|.
The existence of an ε-cover of this size implies that O(log(B)/ε2)-many samples from any p ∈ P suffice
to learn some q ∈ P such that ‖p− q‖TV ≤ O(ε), using a tournament-style density estimation algorithm;
see e.g. [29, 26, 1] and their references. Thus, to prove the second part of the theorem statement it suffices
to argue that an ε-cover of size B exists. We prove the existence of this cover by exploiting the following
lemma.
Lemma 13. Suppose p and q are Bayesenets on the same DAG G = (V, E). Suppose that, for all v ∈ V, for all
σ ∈ ΣΠ(v), where Π(v) are the parents of v in G (using the same notation as in Definition 8), it holds that∥∥∥pXv |XΠv=σ − qXv |XΠv=σ∥∥∥TV ≤ ε|V| .
Then ‖p− q‖TV ≤ ε.
Proof of Lemma 13: We employ a hybrid argument. First, let us denote n = |V| and label the nodes in V with
labels 1, . . . , n according to some topological sorting of G. In particular, the parents (if any) of any node
i have indices < i. Now, for our hybrid argument we construct the following auxiliary distributions, for
i = 0, . . . , n:
hi(x) =
i
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv)
n
∏
v=i+1
qXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv), for all x ∈ Σ
V .
In particular, h0 ≡ q and hn ≡ p, and the rest are fictional distributions. By triangle inequality, we have
that:
‖p− q‖TV ≤
n
∑
i=1
∥∥∥hi − hi−1∥∥∥
TV
.
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We will bound each term on the RHS by ε/n to conclude the proof of the lemma. Indeed,∥∥∥hi − hi−1∥∥∥
TV
=∑
x
i
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) ·
n
∏
v=i+1
qXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv)−
i−1
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) ·
n
∏
v=i
qXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv)
=∑
x
i−1
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) ·
(
pXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi )− qXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi )
)
·
n
∏
v=i+1
qXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv)
=∑
x
i−1
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) · pXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi )− qXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi ) ·
n
∏
v=i+1
qXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv)
= ∑
x1...i−1
(
i−1
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) · ∑
xi
(
pXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi )− qXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi ) · ∑xi+1...n
(
n
∏
v=i+1
qXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv)
)))
= ∑
x1...i−1
(
i−1
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) · ∑
xi
(
pXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi )− qXi |XΠi (xi|xΠi )
))
≤ ∑
x1...i−1
(
i−1
∏
v=1
pXv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) · ε/n
)
=ε/n,
where for the inequality we used the hypothesis in the statement of the lemma.2
Now suppose p ∈ P is an arbitrary Bayesnet defined on G. It follows from Lemma 13 that p lies ε-
close in total variation distance to a Bayesnet q such that, for all v ∈ V, and all σ ∈ ΣΠv , the conditional
distribution qXv |XΠv=σ is a discretized version of pXv |XΠv=σ that is
ε
n -close in total variation distance. Note
that pXv |XΠv=σ is an element of the simplex over |Σ| elements, and it is easy to see that this simplex can be
ε
n -covered, in total variation distance, using a discrete set of at most
(
n|Σ|
ε
)|Σ|
-many distributions. As there
are at most n · |Σ|d conditional distributions to discretize, a total number of
B =
(
n|Σ|
ε
)n|Σ|d+1
discretized distributions suffice to cover all P .
To prove the first part of the theorem statement, we proceed in the same way, except that now that we
do not know the DAG our cover will be larger. Since there are at most ndn DAGs of indegree at most d on n
labeled vertices, and for each DAG there is a cover of all Bayesnets defined on that DAG of size at most B,
as above, it follows that there is an ε-cover, in total variation distance, of all Bayesnets of indegree at most d
of size:
ndn · B.
Given the bound on the cover size, the proof concludes by appealing to tournament-style density estimation
algorithms, as we did earlier. This completes our proof for the finite alphabet case.
Alphabet Σ = [0, H]: Let δ = εdCn , and Σδ be the set of all multiples of δ between 0 and H.
11 For any
set of nodes S and x = (xv)v∈S, we use bxcδ to denote the corresponding rounded vector
(b xvδ c · δ)v∈S. We
first define distribution p˜ to be the rounded version of p using the following coupling. For any sample x
drawn from p, create a sample x˜ = bxcδ drawn from p˜. Note that (i) this coupling makes sure that the two
samples from p and p˜ are always within ε of each other in `1-distance. Our plan is to show that we can (ii)
11We further assume that H is a multiple of δ. If not, let k be the integer such that δ ∈
[
H
2k
, H
2k−1
]
, and change δ to be H
2k
.
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learn a Bayesnet q with in-degree at most d using polynomially many samples from distribution p˜ such that
‖q− p˜‖TV = O(ε). Why does this imply our claim? First, we can generate a sample from p˜ using a sample
from p due to the coupling between the two distributions. Second, ‖q− p˜‖TV = O(ε) means that we can
couple q and p˜ in a way that the two samples are the same with probability at least 1−O(ε). Composing
this coupling with the coupling between p˜ and p, we have a coupling between p and q such that the two
samples are at most ε away from each other in `1-distance with probability at least 1−O(ε). This implies,
according to Theorem 4, that ‖p− q‖P = O(ε). Now, we focus on proving (ii) and separate the proof into
three steps.
• (Step 1:) We first prove that there is a Bayesnet p′′ with in-degree at most d and alphabet Σδ such
that ‖ p˜− p′′‖TV ≤ ε. We first construct a Bayesnet p′ on the same DAG as p, where the conditional
probability distribution for every node v, and σ ∈ ΣΠv is defined as
p′Xv |XΠ(v)=σ ≡ pXv |XΠ(v)=bσcδ .
Clearly, for any node v, and σ ∈ ΣΠv ,∥∥∥pXv |XΠ(v)=σ − p′Xv |XΠ(v)=σ∥∥∥TV =
∥∥∥pXv |XΠ(v)=σ − pXv |XΠ(v)=bσcδ ∥∥∥TV ≤ C · ‖σ− bσcδ‖1 ≤ Cdδ ≤ ε|V| .
Hence, Lemma 13 implies that: (iii) ‖p− p′‖TV ≤ ε.12
Next, we construct the rounded distribution p′′ of p′ via the following coupling. For any sample x′
drawn from p′, create a sample x′′ = bx′cδ from p′′. It is not hard to verify that p′′ can also be captured
by a Bayesnet defined on the same DAG as p and p′. In particular, for every node v, every xv ∈ Σδ,
and xΠv ∈ ΣΠvδ , the conditional probability is
p′′Xv |XΠv (xv|xΠv) =
∫ xv+δ
xv
p′Xv |XΠv (z|xΠv) dz.
As p′′ is the rounded distribution of p′, p˜ is the rounded distribution of p, and ‖p− p′‖TV ≤ ε, it must
be the case that ‖p′′ − p˜‖TV ≤ ε.
• (Step 2:) Let P be the set of all Bayesnets defined on a DAG with n nodes and in-degree at most d,
and which have alphabet Σδ. We argue that there is a size A = ndn ·
(
n|Σδ |
ε
)n|Σδ |d+1
ε-cover P ′, in total
variation distance, of P , and P ′ ⊂ P . This follows from the same argument we did in the proof for the
finite alphabet case. First, there are ndn different DAGs with n nodes and in-degree at most d. Second,
for each DAG there are at most n · |Σδ|d conditional distributions. Finally, it suffices to εn -cover each
conditional distribution, in total variation distance, which can be accomplished by a discrete set of
at most
(
n|Σδ |
ε
)|Σδ |
-many distributions. Since p′′ ∈ P and ‖p′′ − p˜‖TV ≤ ε, there exists a Bayesnet q˜
from the ε-cover P ′ such that ‖q˜− p˜‖TV ≤ 2ε.
• (Step 3:) Since minq′∈P ′ ‖q′ − p˜‖TV ≤ 2ε, we can use a tournament-style density estimation algorithm
(see e.g. [29, 26, 1] and their references) to learn a Bayesnet q ∈ P ′ such that ‖q− p˜‖TV = O(ε) given
O
(
log A
ε2
)
samples from p˜ .
To sum up, we can learn a Bayesnet q defined on a DAG with in-degree at most d using
O
d|V| log |V|+ |V| ·
(
H|V|dC
ε
)d+1
log
( |V|HdC
ε
)
ε2

samples from p such that ‖q− p‖P ≤ ε. If the DAG that p is defined on is known, the sample complexity
improves to O
(
|V|·
(
H|V|dC
ε
)d+1
log
( |V|HdC
ε
)
ε2
)
.
12Even though Lemma 13 was only proved earlier for a finite alphabet, the same proof extends to when the alphabet is infinite.
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Latent Variable Model: Finally, we consider the case where only k out of the n variables of the Bayesnet
p are observable. Let S be the set of observable variables, and use pS to denote the marginal of p on these
variables. We will first consider the finite alphabet case. Consider the ε-cover we constructed earlier. We
argued that for any Bayesnet p there exists an Bayesnet q in the cover such that ‖p− q‖TV ≤ ε. For that q
we clearly also have ‖pS − qS‖TV ≤ ε. The issue is that we do not know for a given q in the cover which
subset of its variables set S might correspond to. But this is not a big deal. We can use our cover to generate
an ε-cover of all possible marginals pS of all possible Bayesnets p as follows. Indeed, for any q′ in the
original ε-cover, we include in the new cover the marginal distribution q′S′ of every possible subset S
′ of its
variables of size k. This increases the size of our original cover by a multiplicative factor of at most nk. As
a result, the number of samples required for the tournament-style density estimation algorithm to learn a
good distribution increases by a multiplicative factor of k log n. For the infinite alphabet case, our statement
follows from applying the same modification to the ε-cover of p˜. 2
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